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VOLUME XXXV 2000 NUMBER 2 
WYOMING'S RESIDENTIAL RENTAL 

PROPERTY ACT -A CRITICAL REVIEW 

*Arthur R. Gaudio 
I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
Introduction 
Landlord tenant law in Wyoming has received very little attention by 
the legislature and even by the courts during the last century. Most of the 
legislation prior to 1999 merely accepted, or provided only slight modifica­
tions to, the common law structure existing when Wyoming became a state. 
The relatively few reported court decisions have dealt, for the most part, 
with agricultural' or commercial leases,> options to purchase contained in 
leases,' or the landlord's liability to third parties who are injured on the 
leased premises: Residential leases have been more or less an orphan child 
* Arthur R. Gaudio is a Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus at the University of Wyoming Col­
lege of Law. He is a recognized property law expert and edited AMERICAN LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 
(Arthur R. Gaudio, ed., 1994). He thanks Kyle Smith, University of Wyoming College of Law, class of 
2001, for his valuable research assistance. 
\. See, e.g., McClellan v. Britain, 826 P.2d 245, 246 (Wyo. 1992); Bowen v. Korell, 587 P.2d 653, 
654 (Wyo. 1978). 
2. See, e.g., Sheridan Commercial Park,lnc. v. Briggs, 848 P.2d 811,813 (Wyo. 1993). 
3. See. e.g., J Bar H, Inc. v. Martin, 872 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Wyo. 1994); Svalina v. Split Rock Land 
& Cattle Co., 816 P.2d 878, 879 (Wyo. 1991). 
4. See, e.g., Taylor v. Schukei Family Trust, 996 P.2d \3 (Wyo. 2000); Roberts v. Klinkosh, 986 
P.2d 153, 154 (Wyo. 1999); Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405, 406 (Wyo. 1997); Ortega v. 
Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 200 (Wyo. 1995). 
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in the Wyoming legal structure, perhaps with understandable social and 
economIC reason. 
Wyoming is not a populous state with many large cities; even in its 
larger cities the population density would not be described as high. In many 
states more populous than Wyoming, particularly those with large cities, the 
lack of physical real estate space has tended to drive up the cost of housing 
ownership. With the initial investment cost for home ownership being high, 
the logical alternative is the no-front-end cost of a rented residence. As a 
very rural state the pressures and costs of residential ownership in Wyoming 
have not been as pressing. Home ownership, whether in the State's rela­
tively small cities or on the ranch or farm, was not only fmancially possible 
but culturally was the thing to do. 
Nevertheless, even in Wyoming, cities have grown and real estate 
space in them is often at a premium. Residential rental properties have be­
come a housing alternative for many people. For some it may be a tempo­
rary place to live while in school and before moving on to a more perma­
nent home. For others, often those with jobs and life situations that cannot 
provide the initial investment needed for home ownership, the rented home 
has become a permanent home. 
With such a small body of landlord tenant law based primarily on out­
dated common law principles, the protections that a tenant can expect are 
quite limited. The common law concept of a landlord tenant relationship is 
based on the premise that a tenant receives a conveyance of a leasehold es­
tate from the landlord that lasts for a term. During the term, the tenant has a 
duty to pay the rent and perform the other obligations contained in the lease. 
However, the landlord's primary duties are to assure the tenant that he has 
the legal right to possess the residential unit and to perform only such other 
obligations as the tenant can negotiate. If the landlord should breach any of 
those duties, the tenant has a right to obtain damages from the landlord. 
The tenant might even terminate the lease if the premises are in substantial 
violation of the nineteenth century implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. 
However, the possibilities of staying in place and demanding that the land­
lord make the premises habitable have been non-existent. With one possi­
ble and limited exception, none of the Wyoming cities, where most of the 
residential units are located, have adopted housing codes to require that 
landlords provide safe, sanitary housing that if fit for human habitation. 
Wyoming law has been so devoid of tenant protections that law students 
often speak of the law in this area rather pejoratively as "landlord law" 
rather than "landlord tenant law." 
With the new millennium about to begin, the Wyoming legislature took 
a significant first step in an attempt to deal with some of the more pressing 
issues presented by residential leases. In its 1999 session, it adopted, and 
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the governor signed, an act entitled "Residential Rental Property."l The Act 
was previously considered at the committee level in 1997, but was defeated 
before ever reaching the floor of either the House or the Senate: It was 
revived in the 1999 legislative session and was enacted after considerable 
debate and many amendments. The Act is now codified as Article 12 
(Residential Rental Property), Chapter 21 (Justices of the Peace - Procedure 
and Actions), Title 1 (Code of Civil Procedure) of the Wyoming Statutes. 
The Act obligates landlords to provide tenants in residential rental 
properties with units that are "in a safe and sanitary condition fit for human 
habitation,"7 requires that tenants participate in the maintenance of their 
rental units," and provides tenants with remedies if their landlords breach 
their obligations under the Act! The Act also creates certain duties and 
procedures for landlords in refunding deposits or applying those deposits to 
the payment of damages caused by tenants.·O Finally, the Act creates a pro­
cedure for removing personal property left in the units by tenants and re­
turning it or, in the alternative, disposing of it without liability for conver­
sion.1I 
A BriefHistory ofLandlord Tenant Law12 
To appreciate the objectives of this new legislation, a brief history of 
landlord tenant law is useful. In reviewing that history, I will focus on the 
development of the law regarding a cohesively paired set of issues-land­
lords' duties and tenants' remedies!' The end product of this development, 
in most U.S. jurisdictions, is that landlords have a duty to provide tenants 
with habitable housing and that landlords are subject to a variety of reme­
dies for the enforcement of that duty. 
The law of landlord and tenant began to develop during the latter Mid­
dle Ages at a time when the English economy started to move its focus from 
the manor to the town. Although only in increments, land was beginning to 
lose its place as a status symbol and a means of power and authority. It was 
gradually coming to be viewed as a commodity to be traded in the market­
5. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-21-1201 to-1211 (LEXIS 1999). 
6. Interview with State Senator Phillip Nicholas (Jan. 19, 2000). 
7. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202(a)(LEXIS 1999). 
8. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-21-1204 & 1205 (LEXIS 1999). 
9. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-21-1203«b) & 1206(b) - (d) (LEXIS 1999). 
10. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-21-1207 to-1209,-1211(b)(LEXIS 1999). 
11. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-21-1210 & -121 I (a)(LEXIS 1999). 
12. See generally Krista L. Noonan & Frederick M. Preator, Comment, Implied Warranty ofHabita­
bility: It Is Time to Bury the Beast Known as Caveat Emptor, 33 Land & Water L. Rev. 329 (1998). 
13. While my objective of this brief history will be to focus on landlords' duties and tenants' reme­
dies, the complementary pair, i.e., tenants' duties and landlords' remedies, is also important. In many 
cases, tenants do not perfonn their duties and there is a need to consider the remedies available to the 
landlord. In fact, the Wyoming Residential Rental Property Act does consider this pairing, and I will 
discuss it later in this article. 
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place. That trend has continued and grown to such an extent that today, it is 
no surprise to see residential and commercial property, and even ranches 
and farms, bought and sold with not much more attention than the sale of 
stocks or bonds of an equivalent value. 
One of the initial uses of the leasehold estate was as a financing device 
for persons in need of funds. A person owning a freehold estate might want 
to borrow money, but according to laws then existing in England, the 
charging of any interest on a loan was usury. However, a lease of the bor­
rower's real property to the lender was available as an alternative. The 
lender-tenant could lend money to the borrower-landlord with the expecta­
tion that the rents or profits from the land would more than provide a satis­
factory return, albeit not in a form labeled "interest." Another initial use of 
the leasehold estate, more in keeping with our present day concept of leas­
ing, involved a prospective entrepreneur needing a shop to sell his mer­
chandise. Not having the current funds needed to purchase the shop, since 
he would need that money to buy his inventory or the raw materials, he 
might lease the shop for a term of years. It made no difference to him since 
he had a place in which to establish his store and sell his merchandise. I' 
Throughout its development, the leasehold estate was a stepchild of the 
law and the courts did not know quite where to place it. The subject matter 
of a lease certainly was land, but it was not an estate in land that was befit­
ting a freeholder:' Thus, the leasehold came to be known as a non-freehold 
estate. In fact, so lowly was its caste that the English common law courts 
did not provide tenants the same remedies available to holders of freehold 
estates. Tenants did not have access to the real actions for recovery of pos­
session. They could only sue for damages, although eventually other reme­
dies were developed.16 Since tenants did not have the same remedies as 
owners of real property, the courts considered the leasehold estate to be 
personal property. However, the courts could not completely avert the idea 
that leasehold estates had something to do with real property. Thus, we find 
the rather curious use of the term "chattels real" to describe leasehold es­
tates in land.17 
Because leasehold estates were such lowly forms of ownership, it is 
easy to understand why the courts did not desire to expand landlords' duties 
to tenants beyond those stated in the leases themselves. Similarly, since 
landlords owned the more prestigious freehold estates in the lands they 
14. See generally THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL O. HASKELL, PREFACE TO EsTATES IN LAND AND 
FUTURE INTERESTS 38-42 (2d ed. 1984). 
15. A gentleman of the day would only own estates in fee simple, fee tailor for life, i.e., the freehold 
estates. 
16. In due course, the tenant was granted the remedy of ejectment. 
17. See generally CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 56-58 
(2d ed. 1988). 
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leased, it is easy to understand why the courts did not provide tenants much 
in terms of remedies against those landlords.'s 
While the economy was changing, it was still basically agrarian in na­
ture. Tenants, like all good farmers, basically had to provide for all their 
needs. They were considered jacks-of- all-trades and able to master what­
ever difficulties they encountered with their leased premises. The landlord 
had no duty to repair or even to provide amenities such as heat or water." If 
the tenant wanted the landlord to provide a particular amenity or service for 
the premises, he had to negotiate and include it in the lease agreement.20 
If the lease did contain a covenant to provide certain services, virtually 
the sole remedy available to the tenant was a suit for damages. In that era, 
the courts adhered to the concept that all covenants in the lease were inde­
pendent of each other. Each promise by a party to the lease was a solemn 
bond and the failure by one party to perform his obligation did not excuse 
the other party from performing his own covenant. Thus, the tenant could 
not refuse to pay his rent because the landlord had failed to abide by his 
covenant. The tenant had to continue to pay his rent and seek relief in the 
courts via damages for breach of the landlord's covenant.2' 
Not to be ignored in this stage of the development of landlord tenant 
law was the fact that the basic remedy available to the landlords was also 
damages. In the lease, the landlord had conveyed a leasehold estate to the 
tenant for a stated term. In that lease, the tenant also promised to pay the 
rent, but the tenant's covenant was also independent of the landlord's cove­
nant to provide the leasehold estate. As a result, the landlord could not ter­
minate the lease for nonpayment ofrent, just as the tenant could not cease to 
pay rent because of the landlord's failure to provide a specified service.22 
As previously noted, land was changing from a status symbol and be­
coming a commodity to be traded in the economy. As with any economy, 
the law of supply and demand played an important part in determining lease 
18. See generally id. at 71-76. One noteworthy exception was the concept that a tenant who was 
evicted from the premises by the landlord had suffered a destruction of his leasehold estate. As a result, 
the tenant did not have to pay the rent or perform the other duties prescribed in the lease. Id. at 74-75. 
This was an early application of the yet-to-be developed contract doctrine of consideration. The landlord 
had failed to deliver his consideration (possession of the leasehold estate), and thus the tenant was not 
obliged to deliver his consideration (the rent prescribed to purchase the leasehold estate). However, for 
centuries yet to come this was as far as the courts were willing to go. 
19. After all, the well was nearby and the fireplace provided the heat. These amenities were both in 
the easy reach of the tenant. 
20. See generally. supra note 17, at 71-73. 
21. See generally Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 840 (Mass. 1973). 
22. One would be quite correct to notice that, the situation in which landlords and tenants found 
themselves was not at all like contract law as we know it today. At that period in the development of 
landlord tenant law, the law of contract was not yet formed. Consideration and the concept of quid pro 
quo were not a part of the law. See generally ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 20, at 30­
31 (I Vol. ed. 1952). 
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prices and terms. With growing populations and entrepreneurial needs, 
demands for land, a scarce and limited resource, were growing. Not only 
was the amount of land scarce, but the owners of that resource were even 
fewer. The availability of the land resource was controlled by an oligopoly. 
If landlords were few, it was not necessary for them actually to unite in an 
agreement in restraint of trade for the purpose of setting prices and terrns­
the structure of the economy could and did take care of that for them. 
Not surprisingly, landlords, seeking to obtain speedier relief than was 
provided in an action for damages, inserted conditions into their leases. 
These conditions were essentially all the same. They provided that in the 
event a tenant should fail to perform a covenant, the landlord could termi­
nate the lease. Such conditions gave landlords more immediate relief, by 
terminating the lease rather than waiting to collect damages from the tenant. 
This new remedy was not inconsequential for the tenant. If a tenant 
should refuse to pay the rent because the landlord failed to perform his 
covenants, the tenant had still breached his covenant to pay rent. Conse­
quently, the landlord could terminate the lease, despite his own malfea­
sance. The tenant would never get a chance to litigate the question of 
whether the landlord had breached his duties as promised in the lease. The 
best remedy for the tenant remained paying the rent and then suing the 
landlord for damages. As one might imagine, the transaction costs of that 
remedy were too high for most tenants-the damages seldom provided suf­
ficient remuneration to pay for attorney's fees and other litigation costs. As 
a result, tenants seldom sought relief." 
At this point in the development of landlord tenant law, the status of 
the landlord's duties and the tenant's remedies were as follows: The land­
lord had a duty to provide the tenant with the leasehold estate and only such 
maintenance or services as specifically agreed upon in the lease. Practically 
speaking, the only remedy available to the tenant was to sue for damages." 
The next stage in the development of landlord tenant law did not occur 
until the industrial revolution was changing the previously agrarian land­
scape of America. By the early nineteenth century, the availability of jobs 
in cities began to bring about a significant expansion of their population. 
People leaving the farm and immigrants entering the country flocked to the 
cities. However scarce land in the cities was before that time, that scarcity 
began to pale by comparison. In terms of supply and demand, the demand 
for housing was growing at a rate far exceeding the available supply. Resi­
23. As a further disincentive to seek damages, when the date for lease renewal arrived the landlord 
could refuse to renew the lease or, if the lease were a month to month tenancy, he could terminate it at 
the end of the next period. The issues of retaliatory eviction are still with us today. 
24. See also Paula C. Murray, Note, The Evolution ofImplied Warranties in Commercial Real Estate 
Leases. 28 U. Rich. L. Rev. 145, 145-46 (1994). 
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dential leaseholds in cities no longer were one family homes. Instead, 
tenements began to rise and filled in much of the available landscape.25 
The conditions in tenements were often deplorable. Heat, running wa­
ter, and other services were frequently not available. Vermin and rodents 
not only ran the alleys and sewers, but occupied hallways and bedrooms. 
Under the law as it existed up to that time, a tenant's refusal to pay his rent 
because of these conditions was followed by the landlord's tennination of 
the lease. There were always new prospective tenants in the wings. 
It was in this atmosphere that the first steps of refonn began. 26 The 
courts resurrected the quaint and honorable covenant of quiet enjoyment 
and put it to work for the tenant. If a lease did not contain an expressed 
covenant of quiet enjoyment, the courts eventually implied one. In inter­
preting the covenant, the courts held that if the tenant's quiet enjoyment was 
so substantially impaired by the landlord as to be tantamount to an eviction, 
the court would find that there had been a constructive eviction.27 
This was the beginning of the intervention of contract law into property 
law. In contract terms, if the landlord's consideration had so materially 
failed as to make quiet enjoyment impossible, the tenant had the right to 
tenninate the lease. In later decisions, courts found that violations of other 
expressed or implied covenants might also provide the basis for the remedy 
of constructive eviction.28 
As a result of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and the doctrine of con­
structive eviction, both the landlord's duties and the tenant's remedies were 
increased in residential lease situations. The landlord's duties expanded to 
include an obligation to supply the tenant with premises that were at least in 
good enough condition that the tenant would not be considered construc­
tively evicted. The traditional examples of conditions that amounted to 
constructive eviction involved infestations by vermin and rodents, the lack 
of any water, hot water, and heat, and eventually the lack of electricity and 
elevator service in a relatively high-rise apartment.29 In order to take ad­
vantage of the remedy, the tenant had to infonn the landlord of the defect 
and give the landlord an opportunity to repair the condition.30 If the condi­
tion was not repaired within a reasonable time, the tenant had to vacate the 
25. See generally Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation ofAmerican Landlord-Tenant Law. 23 
B.C. L Rev. 503, 510-11 (1982). 
26. See, e.g., Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826). 
27. See generally ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, THE LAw OF PROPERTY § 6.33, at 286-88 (2d ed. 1993). 
28. See id. at 286. 
29. See id. at 286-87. 
30. See I AMERICAN LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 5.04 at 5-48 (Arthur R. Gaudio, ed., 1994). 
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premises promptly in order to demonstrate that he and his family had been 
evicted." 
Unfortunately for tenants, this last requirement proved to be a limiting 
factor in the desirability of the remedy. First of all, many tenants had no 
real desire to move; they only wanted their landlords to supply the neces­
sary amenities for habitable dwellings. Many tenants would much rather 
remain in their current dwellings and withhold an appropriate amount of the 
rent to provide incentives to their landlords to repair the defects or to pro­
vide the services. In some cases, tenants might even prefer to repair the 
defects or provide the services themselves and deduct the cost from the rent. 
However, that was not an option. Their lease still contained a condition, 
unmodified by the doctrine of constructive eviction, which provided that 
upon failure to pay the rent the landlord could terminate the lease. 
The doctrine of constructive eviction provided a further problem for 
tenants. Even if they did want to move to other premises, they often found 
that they could not find new living accommodations in the short time they 
were given under the doctrine; they were required to vacate the premises 
promptly. 32 Although that requirement still exists, over the years some 
courts have adapted to the reality that it takes time to find a new dwelling 
and move ouU3 
Finally, the tenant was faced with still another dilemma-the definition 
of a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment was sufficiently unclear that 
he really didn't know whether a court or jury would agree that he had, in 
fact, been constructively evicted. If he was convinced of the correctness of 
his position and willing to take a chance, he could enter into a new lease for 
another dwelling unit. However, the landlord could still bring suit against 
him claiming a continuing obligation to pay the rent and denying a con­
structive eviction.34 If the tenant was correct, he would win and only have to 
face the costs of litigation. If he was wrong he would, in addition, have the 
burden ofthe prior lease added to the burden of the new lease.'s 
Thus, during this period of legal history there were duties that the 
courts were willing to impose on landlords in addition to those contained in 
the lease itself. These might be found in implied covenants such as quiet 
enjoyment. Furthermore, the additional remedy of constructive eviction 
31. See id. 
32. See. e.g.. DeB' Armi Builders, Inc. v. Johnston, 526 N.E.2d 409, 412 (Ill. App. 1988). 
33. See. e.g.. Reste Realty COl]!. v. Cooper, 251 A.2d 268, 277 (N.J. 1969); cf DeB' Armi Builders, 
Inc. v. Johnston, 526 N.E.2d 409, 412 (Ill. App. 1988). 
34. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 30 § 5.04 at 5-48 to -49. 
35. During this period of legal history, the common law rule that the landlord had no obligation to 
mitigate his damages prevailed. In recent years, this too has been ameliorated in some courts by holding 
that the contract obligation to mitigate damages should apply in leases too. See. e.g.• Sommer v. Kridel, 
378 A.2d 767, 773-74 (N.J. 1977). 
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was available to the tenant. Now the tenant hud the right to tenninate the 
lease in addition to the right to seek damages for the breach of an express or 
implied covenant contained in the lease. However impractical the remedy 
of constructive eviction might have been, or however uncertain the land­
lord's duties under the covenant of quiet enjoyment might have been, the 
tenant nevertheless had an increase to both sides of the duty-remedy pair. 
The next step in the development of landlord tenant law in the United 
States brings us essentially to the present era. During the last thirty to forty 
years, many courts and some legislatures have begun to look at the lease in 
a new light. A lease has aspects of two different legal concepts-a property 
law aspect and a contract law aspect. Because a lease conveys a leasehold 
estate from the landlord to the tenant, it has a conveyance or property law 
aspect. Many of the principles established during the early development of 
landlord tenant law, especially the doctrine of independence of covenants, 
are viewed as part of the property law aspect of leases. However, because 
the lease also contains contractual obligations--covenants-made by the 
landlord and the tenant, a lease also has a contract law aspect. 
As we have seen, throughout most of the history of landlord tenant law 
the courts have chosen to emphasize the property law aspect of the lease and 
have generally minimized or ignored the contract law aspect. In our recent 
era, however, many courts and legislatures have chosen to give a better look 
at the contract law side of the lease. This has brought about another round 
of much needed reforms. After all, they reason, the real and obvious intent 
of the residential tenant)6 is to acquire a package of residential goods and 
services amounting to habitable premises and not merely the conveyance of 
a leasehold estate in which she might have to make repairs in order to reside 
there.J1 Thus, they hold, in every residential lease there should be an im­
plied warranty of habitability.l8 This warranty is a contractual obligation 
and its breach makes available to the tenant a variety of contract remedies.J• 
As a product of this new perspective, there has been the development of an 
additional set of landlords' duties and tenants' remedies. 
However, the fundamental policy reasons supporting the adoption of an 
implied warranty of habitability are considerably more expansive than the 
inferred intent of the parties. Unlike her agrarian ancestor, the residential 
tenant of today is not a jack-of-all-trades. She usually is raised in an urban 
environment, not an agrarian one, and she has not developed the skills 
needed to make many of the repairs that a house or apartment needs. There 
36. Under this approach, the landlord acknowledges the tenant's intent by agreeing to the residential 
dwelling lease. 
37. See, e.g., lavins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-78 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
38. See, e.g., id. at \080-83; Wade v. lobe, SIS P.2d 1006,1009-11 (Utah \991); Hilder v. St. Peter, 
478 A.2d 202, 208-10 (VI. 1984). 
39. See, e.g., Juvins, 428 F.2d at \080-83; Hilder, 478 A.2d at 208-10. 
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is an added reality to the tenant's inability to make these repairs when one 
realizes that so many aspects of a residential dwelling today are technologi­
cally quite sophisticated. Beyond that, multiple housing units are interre­
lated and interconnected. To correct a defect in one tenant's unit may re­
quire access to other units or to areas reserved to the landlord's control. For 
example, the cause of a lack of heat may lie in a defect in the central heating 
system, which is located in a central location legally accessible only by the 
landlord. Furthermore, the tenant probably does not have the ability to fi­
nance the repairs that must be made, such as in the central heating system." 
To these policy considerations must be added the fact that residential 
tenants today are, for the most part, in even poorer bargaining positions vis­
a-vis their landlords than were their ancestors. The supply side of the resi­
dential rental economy is even more oligopolistic than it was in the past. 
Each real estate management company represents multiple landlords who 
own multiple properties. Their presence in the residential rental market­
place further reduces the number of supply-side negotiators. They work 
from prepared lease forms, which are drafted by, and given the blessing of, 
their legal counsel. Variation from the wording of these documents is un­
usual and limited. The need to take steps to adjust these bargaining ine­
qualities is a primary reason why courts and legislatures have intervened:' 
If the marketplace makes it too difficult or impossible for a residential ten­
ant to obtain her landlord's promise that her housing will be habitable, then 
a promise will be implied. 
Courts have taken two somewhat different methods in determining 
what the landlords' duties should be under an implied warranty of habita­
bility. Under one approach, the landlord must substantially comply with the 
housing code applicable in the venue where the leased residential unit is 
located. In other words, rather than attempt to make up a separate set of 
rules for residential landlords, the courts have looked to the local or state 
legislatures to set the standard. While housing codes have their own en­
forcement methods, usually through a local housing inspector, the courts 
have also given tenants the right to use the judicial system to enforce the 
codes." 
Under the second approach, there is a recognition that not all areas of 
the state43 may be governed by a housing code. Looking only to housing 
codes for the answer would give protection to tenants in some areas, but not 
to tenants located elsewhere. Furthermore, these courts have also recog­
nized that housing codes may contain provisions, the breach of which 
40. See. e.g.. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074-78; Wade, 818 P.2d at 1009-11. 
41. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074-78. 
42. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1081-82. 
43. In some states, there may be no part of the state governed by a housing code, e.g. Wyoming. 
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should not result in a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Under 
this second approach, the duty of the landlord is to provide a tenant with 
premises that are in fact safe, sanitary and fit for human habitation, a stan­
dard of habitability in fact. Housing codes, if applicable, are excellent evi­
dence of the meaning of habitability, but they are not conclusive. Further­
more, the lack of a housing code does not mean that the landlord has no 
obligation to supply habitable housing. Of necessity, the standard of habi­
tability in fact is a general guide for defining habitability even though a 
landlord's duties might not be as clear as they would be under a housing 
code. Nevertheless, the duty of the landlord is still to provide habitable 
housing." 
On the remedy side of the issue, the normal contract remedies are 
meant to apply. Two contract remedies have been available to tenants for 
some time; damages for breach of contract (covenant), and rescission or 
termination (constructive eviction) because of a substantial failure of con­
sideration on the part of the landlord. The new remedies usually available 
under the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability may be considered as 
derived from either specific performance or reformation. 
The first of these remedies is rent abatement. 4S The tenant's right to 
abate the rent is based on the view that if the landlord has failed to provide 
the consideration he promised in the lease, the tenant can seek specific per­
formance of the lease but with a proportional abatement in the tenant's con­
sideration (the rent) in order to reflect the true value of the leasehold prem­
ises. From the reformation perspective, the tenant may ask the court to re­
form the lease to reflect a reduced rent measured by the true value of the 
leasehold premises." 
The second new remedy is rent application," sometimes known as re­
pair and offset.'· If the landlord's failure is in performing a repair that the 
tenant can perform, then the tenant may do so and deduct the cost of the 
repair from the rents next due. This remedy also might be viewed as a fail­
ure of consideration by the landlord, allowing the tenant to seek specific 
performance of the lease with a reduction of the tenant's consideration by a 
similar amount. However, the entire amount is deducted from the next rents 
due, not just an amount reflecting the reduction in value. From the refor­
44. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796-97 (1973); Hilder, 478 A.2d at 209. 
45. See, e.g., Wade, SIS P.2d at lOll; Hilder, 47S A.2d at 210. See generally REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.1 (1986). 
46. A variation of this remedy is for the tenant to deposit her rent with the clerk of court and ask the 
court to determine who is entitled to it. To the extent that the landlord has breached his duty to provide 
habitable housing, the court should refund all or a portion of it to the tenant. The Restatement refers to 
this remedy as rent withholding. [d. at § 11.3. 
47. SeegeneraUy REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.2 (1986) .. 

4S. See. e.g., Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 534-35 (N.J. 1970). 
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mation perspective, the tenant may ask the court to reform the lease to re­
duce the tenant's consideration by the cost of the repair.'9 
Thus, in adding up all of the landlord's duties and the tenant's reme­
dies in most U.S. jurisdictions today, we have the following: The landlord 
has a duty to comply with his obligations set forth in the lease, to supply the 
tenant with premises that were not so totally deplorable that the tenant 
would be considered evicted by their condition (covenant of quiet enjoy­
ment), and to comply with the duties imposed by the implied warranty of 
habitability. The tenant may seek relief in several ways. She may seek 
damages for breach of any of the landlord's duties, terminate the lease if she 
is constructively evicted, abate the rent to reflect the true value of the 
premises, or repair the defect and offset its cost from the next rents due. 
As of the 1999 legislative session, no cases had been decided by the 
Wyoming Supreme Court creating an implied warranty of habitability in 
residential leases.'o In that session, the legislature stepped in to fill the void 
by enacting the Residential Rental Property Act." As will be discussed be­
low, the Act clearly creates an implied warranty of habitability. The pur­
pose of this article is to discuss how the implied warranty created by the Act 
compares with the implied warranty of habitability, as described in the 
above historical development. I will discuss the nature of the landlord's 
duties as established by the Act and other sources that may supplement or 
more fully describe those duties. I will also review the tenant's remedies set 
out in the Act and will consider alternative remedies not specified in the 
Act. Further, I will review the tenant's duties set out in the Act and the 
remedies it provides the landlord for enforcement of those duties. Finally, I 
will consider the implications that might be derived from the Act regarding 
a landlord's tort liabilities to a tenant or her third party guests. 
49. The reformation approach may be more fitting than the specific performance approach in ana­
lyzing the repair and offset remedy. The tenant is generally not aIlowed to offset against her considera­
tion an amount greater than one month's rent. See id. The policy reason for this limitation is that the 
remedy should not allow a tenant to finance substantial repairs out of the landlord's current revenues, 
which may be needed for other purposes such as provision of other services and payment of real estate 
taxes. Under the reformation approach, the court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, can limit the 
size of the reduction. 
50. However, the Wyoming Supreme Court has determined that there is an implied warranty of 
habitability in the sale of residential premises by a builder of housing. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 
600 P.2d 733, 735-36 (Wyo. 1979). In Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199 (Wyo. 1995) the Supreme Court 
decided that without ''relevant data and analysis which supports the legal, social and/or economic theo­
ries behind abrogating the common law," it would not extend the implied warranty of habitability to 
rental premises under the facts of the case. Id. at 204. 
51. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-21-1201 to -1211 (LEXIS I 999). 
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II. WYOMING LAW 
Law Prior to the Residential Rental Property Act 
As was previously stated,s' courts have traditionally allowed the tenant 
the right to recover damages from the landlord for the breach of a covenant 
specifically contained in the lease. Although the cases are not many, there 
is no disagreement with that position in the Wyoming decisions. 
For example, in Wolin v. Walker'3 the landlord rendered the premises 
temporarily untenantable because he was removing underground gasoline 
storage tanks. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the tenant was enti­
tled to recover damages as provided in the liquidated damages clause of the 
lease.54 In Skeoch v. Electri-Center," the lease contained a rent escalator 
clause that provided for rent increases in accordance with increases in a 
specified cost of living index. In violation of the lease agreement, the 
landlord increased rent based on a different index. The court affirmed the 
lower court's determination that the tenant had been damaged under the 
terms of the lease. The damages were an amount measured by the excess 
rent charged.s6 In Bowen v. Korell,s' the Wyoming Supreme Court granted 
damages against a landlord for breach of an agricultural lease. The landlord 
had failed to supply irrigation water in a timely fashion as provided in the 
lease.'· Thus, the basic tenant remedy--damages-has been sustained by 
the Wyoming courts. If the tenant is injured by the landlord's breach of a 
covenant as stated in the lease, she may bring an action to recover damages. 
Although the Wyoming cases on point are very few, the Wyoming Su­
preme Court has adopted the doctrine of constructive eviction.s9 In the ear­
liest Wyoming decision60 involving the doctrine, the court quoted at length 
from several cases decided in other jurisdictions about the requirements of 
52. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24. 
53. 830 P.2d 429 (Wyo. 1992). The court further stated that the tenant could not withhold rent for 
the period during which the landlord was in breach of the lease. Since the tenant had withheld rent for 
several months, the landlord was allowed to offset that amount against the tenant's damages. Id. at 433­
34. The court did not actually hold that the lease could be terminated for failure to pay rent. It merely 
recognized that the landlord had served the tenant with a notice to quit for failure to pay rent, and the 
tenant voluntarily complied therewith. Id. at 431. 
54. Id. at 433. 
55. 778 P.2d 104 (Wyo. 1989). 
56. Id. at 105. 
57. 587 P.2d 653 (Wyo. 1978). 
58. Id. at 655. There was some ambiguity about whether the lease actually contained a covenant to 
supply irrigation water for the field in question. Based on the wording of the lease and the testimony 
presented at trial the court held that the trial court was not in error as a matter oflaw when it held that the 
covenant requires the landlord to supply water to the particular field. !d. 
59. In only three cases was the doctrine presented in a landlord tenant situation. Goodwin v. Upper 
Crust of Wyoming, Inc., 624 P.2d 1192 (Wyo. 1981); Scott v. Prazma, 555 P.2d 571 (Wyo. 1976); 
Mileski v. Kerby, 113 P.2d 950 (Wyo. 1941). In one other case, the doctrine was presented in the con­
text ofa deed conveying a fee simple. Patel v. Khan, 970 P.2d 836 (Wyo. 1998). 
60. Mileski v. Kerby, 113 P.2d 950 (Wyo. 1941). 
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the doctrine. The court decided that in order to breach the covenant there 
must be a substantial deprivation of beneficial enjoyment of the premises.61 
In that case, and others, the court expanded the doctrine. The deprivation 
must be substantial both in terms of the severity of the breach as well as in 
its length or continuity,,2 If the covenant has been breached, the tenant must 
do two things before the lease may be terminated. First, she must notify the 
landlord of the defect arising from the breach and give the landlord a rea­
sonable period of time to correct the defect.63 Second, in order to prove that 
there was an eviction, albeit constructive, the tenant must vacate the prem­
ises.6C 
It is interesting to note that none of the Wyoming landlord tenant cases 
involving the doctrine of constructive eviction dealt with the condition of 
residential premises. In Scott v. Prazma,65 the tenant occupied an old, di­
lapidated building for use as an auto body shop. The court held that the 
landlord had breached an implied covenant to repair and, as a consequence, 
the tenant had been constructively evicted. In Mileski v. Kerby,66 the tenant 
had rented premises for use as a movie theater. The court found that the 
acts of the landlord "did not materially interfere"67 with the tenant's use of 
the premises and "were insufficient to constitute an eviction" of the tenant.68 
61. Id. at 952-53. 
62. See Scott. 555 P.2d at 579. "Grounds must amount to a substantial interference with possession 
of enjoyment." See also Mileski. 113 P.2d at 952, where the court quoted from Parke v. Proby, 130 m. 
App. 571,1906 WL 2374, at I (1906): "Actions of the landlord which will sustain a constructive evic­
tion must be of a grave and permanent character ...." In Mileski, I I3 P.2d at 952, the court also noted 
that a tenant was not constructively evicted "where the interference with the ... [tenant's] rights was 
brief and insignificant" citing Kelley v. Long, 122 P. 832 (Cal. App. 1912). The court in Mileski, 113 
P.2d at 953 also quoted from Meeker v. Spalsbury, 48 A. 1026, \027 (N.J.L. 1901): The breach or 
eviction must be "an act of a permanent character done by the landlord in order to deprive, and which 
had the effect of depriving, the tenant of the use of the thing demised, or a part of it." 
63. In only one of the three landlord tenant cases involving constructive eviction did the court find 
that the landlord had breached a covenant In only that case was the court presented with an opportunity 
to consider the tenant's duties before being able to claim the benefit of the doctrine. The court held that 
there had been a substantial breach of a covenant to repair implied from the wording of the lease. Fur­
thermore, the landlord had been notified by the City of Casper Building Inspector of various serious 
defects and of an inuninent order to evacuate the building. The landlord and tenant had also met several 
times to discuss the duty to make repairs. These events took place over a period of almost ten months. 
The landlord was thus given notice of the defect and allowed an opportunity to repair it. However, the 
landlord continuously maintained that he would not make the repairs and that the tenant should do so. 
Scott, 555 P.2d at 572-75. The court did not specifically discuss the need for the tenant to notify the 
landlord and to give him an opportunity to repair. However, the landlord had received the required 
notice and had refused to correct the defect. Id. at 579-80. 
See generally Kaplan v. McCabe, 532 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Dell' Armi Build­
ers, Inc. v. Johnston, 526 N.E.2d 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Downtown Realty, Inc. v. 509 Tremont Bldg., 
Inc., 748 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). 
64. ''Constructive eviction involves the surrender of possession by the lessee on justifiable grounds 
rather than a deprivation of actual occupancy by direct action of the landlord." Scott, 555 P.2d at 579. 
65. 555 P.2d 571 (Wyo. 1976). 
66. 113 P.2d 950 (Wyo. 1941). 
67. [d. at 953. 
68. [d. The court also appeared to suggest that there was no constructive eviction because the of­
fending actions were not performed by the landlord or anyone with superior title. They were performed 
by the landlord's son. [d. 
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In Goodwin v. Upper Crust of Wyoming, Inc.,69 the tenant subleased com­
mercial space in a mini-mall. The head lease prohibited a sublease without 
the consent of the landlord, and the sublease was conditioned upon receiv­
ing that consent. Although the consent was slow in arriving, the court held 
that the subtenant had not been effectively deprived of the use of the prem­
ises.1O 
Another possible and inexpensive remedy for a residential tenant is to 
seek the help of the housing inspector, who would have to act under the 
authority of a city, county or state housing code. If the apartment was not in 
compliance with the housing code the housing inspector could order the 
landlord to make the repair or be subject to the enforcement provisions of 
the housing code. In many cities nationally this avenue is a very common 
and inexpensive approach to take. However, in Wyoming neither the state 
nor any city or county has a currently enacted housing code." As a result, 
the residential tenant in Wyoming does not have access to this less costly 
form of relief. As of the 1999 legislative session, this was the status of the 
law for the Wyoming residential tenant. 
Wyoming Residential Rental Property Act 
A. Introduction 
The major part of the Wyoming Residential Property Act is derived 
from two Utah statutesn-the Utah Fit Premises Act73 and the Residential 
Renters' Deposits Act." The Act was originally introduced in the 1997 
legislative session7S and reintroduced in a modified form in the 1999 legis­
lative session.'" After additional amendments and changes, it was passed 
and became law as the Wyoming Residential Rental Property Act. In its 
final form, the Wyoming enactment departs substantially from the Utah 
statutes. As originally proposed in 1997, sections 1-21-1201 to -1206 were 
substantially identical to the provisions of the Utah Fit Premises Act and 
sections 1-21-1207 to -1209 were substantially identical to the provisions of 
69. 624P.2d 1192 (Wyo. 1981). 
70. Id. at 1196. 
7 I. Apparently, the City of Casper fonnerly had a housing code but it has since rescinded it. How­
ever, the City has adopted the Unifonn Fire Code and enforces that code against buildings, whether new 
or previously existing. Telephone Interview by Debora A. Person with David Barrett, City of Casper 
(Jan. 27, 2000). While this might give the tenant some recourse against violations of the Fire Code, 
many health and safety issues (e.g, broken windows, nonworking toilet facilities, and lack of hot and 
cold running water) are not contained in the Fire Code. 
n. I will refer to the Utah statutes in passing when discussing some of the provisions of the Wyo­
ming statute. 
73. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-22-1 to -6 (1999). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-38 through 46 
(1999); some of these provisions are similar to the Utah and Wyoming statutes. It may have been an 
original source of the later two enactments. 
74. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-17-1 to -5 (1999). See also infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
75. Wyo. Senate File No. SF0046 (1997). 
76. Wyo. House Bill No. HB 0044 (1999). 
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the Utah Residential Renters' Deposits Act. Section 1-21-1210, dealing 
with personal property left in the dwelling unit by the tenant, is derived 
from the Montana Residential Landlord and Tenant Act of 1977 provision 
dealing with "Disposition of personal property abandoned by tenant after 
termination."n However, as enacted it departs substantially therefrom. 
B. Applicability 
The Act only applies to residential rental units; it does not apply to 
other types of leases such as commercial leases, agricultural leases, or 
grazing leases. A residential rental unit is defined as the "renter's principal 
place of residence. . . ."78 The word "residence" is capable of several 
meanings. A traditional interpretation would define it as the premises in 
which the tenant is currently living regardless of having a more permanent 
abode.7'J However, in appropriate circumstances, the word might take on 
connotations of the word "domicile" and require that the premises be the 
person's permanent place of abode and the one to which she intends to re­
turn after a temporary absence.B<l If the traditional interpretation of residence 
is meant to apply, then a tenant who is living in an apartment while waiting 
for more permanent premises to become available has the protection of the 
Act. However, if the concept of domicile is applied, then a student living in 
an apartment in Laramie for nine months of the year but returning to his 
parents' home in Sheridan for summers and holidays is not protected; she 
does not occupy the unit on a permanent basis with the intent to remain 
there." 
If the term "place of residence" were unmodified, a determination of 
the meaning might be relatively easy since there would be nothing in the 
Act to suggest that a concept like domicile was involved. However, the Act 
uses the word "principal" to modify the term "place of residence," thereby 
possibly invoking connotations of something beyond the idea of mere "resi­
dence." 
While the word "principal" does not necessarily involve the concept of 
permanence and an intent to return, it does suggest that the premises be the 
primary residence versus any other residence occupied by the tenant. For 
example, it presents a question about whether a person owning a home in 
Cheyenne and renting a summer home in Jackson has his principal place of 
77. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-430 (1999). 
78. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1 201 (a}(iv) (LEXIS 1999). The definition provides that a residential 
rental unit also includes "the appurtenances, grounds, common areas and facilities held out for the occu­
pancy of the residential renter generally and any other area or facility provided to the renter in the rental 
agreement. ..." Id. 
79. Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n. v. Woods, 888 P.2d 192, 197 (Wyo. 1994). 
80. McDougall v. McDougall, 961 P.2d 382, 384 (Wyo. 1998). 
81. Nor would the previously stated temporary resident waiting for a more permanent abode be 
considered a resident. 
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residence in Cheyenne or Jackson. An analysis based on the primary nature 
of the residence would suggest that the summer home is not protected by the 
Act. However, one must ask: Why should a tenant who rents an expensive 
home in Jackson not be entitled to heat, electricity, plumbing and hot and 
cold running water? 82 Similarly, the analysis based on the primacy of the 
residence presents a question about the previously mentioned student living 
in an apartment in Laramie. Does she have her principal place of residence 
in Laramie when she spends nine months of the year living there? An 
analysis based on primacy would suggest an affirmative answer. 
In attempting to resolve the meaning of the term "principal place of 
residence," the term should be construed "in light of the context of its use 
and with consideration for the purposes of the Act."8J The purpose of an 
Act creating an implied warranty of habitability is to require that residential 
rental units be safe and sanitary. Any emphasis on the permanency or 
length of the tenancy sidesteps those objectives. If the unit is unsafe and 
unsanitary, a temporary resident is no less deserving of protection than a 
permanent or long term resident. 
Nonetheless, one can not ignore the context of the use of the term 
"principal place of residence." It suggests an analysis based on the primacy 
of the unit as the place of residence versus any other place of residence of 
the tenant. Since that analysis conflicts with the normal purpose of provid­
ing habitable housing for all residents of the State, it must be assumed that 
the Wyoming Act must have a more limited purpose. If so, the Cheyenne 
homeowner who rents a summer home does not occupy it as his "principal 
place of residence" and will not receive the protection of the Act.'" How­
ever, the student spending most of her time living in Laramie rather than in 
Sheridan probably will have her principal place of residence in Laramie.8s 
82. Two exceptions expressly stated in the Act might have some application to this situation. WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-21-120I(a)(iv) (LEXIS 1999) excludes "recreational property rented on an occasional 
basis" from the definition of a "residential rental unit." WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202(a)(LEXIS 1999) 
provides that the listing of these amenities in the Act "shall nol prevent the rental of seasonal rental units 
such as summer cabins which are not intended to have such amenities." Whether a summer home in 
Jackson is a recreational property rented on an occasional basis is not clear. However, it is doubtful that 
an expensive summer rental in Jackson is a "summer cabin" not intended to have such amenities. 
83. Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 888 P.2d at 198. 
84. However incongruous it seems, a person living in the Jackson home the other eight months of the 
year and living elsewhere in the summer would be considered to occupy it as a principal place of resi­
dence and would be able to use the Act to require the landlord to correct unsafe or unsanitary conditions. 
The legislature should reconsider this conundrum, especially since the Act resolves the issue of summer 
cabins and recreational property elsewhere. See supra note 82. 
85. A college student has usually begun her move to a life independent of her parents and the fact 
that her permanent place of abode used to be with her parents should no longer form part of the analysis. 
Compare State ex reI. School Dist. No. I, Niobrara Co. v. School Dist. No. 12, Niobrara Co., 18 P.2d 
1010, 1013 (Wyo. 1933) where the statutory requirement of residency was given a meaning equivalent 
to domicile in the case of high school students. 
Students living in college dormitories do not seem to be protected by the Act. The usual inter­
pretation of a dormitory arrangement is that it is a license under which the college merely gives the 
student a right to use a room but does not give the student exclusive possession of it. The college gener­
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The status of the person living in the apartment awaiting a more permanent 
home is unclear." 
C. Landlord's Duties 
1. Habitability 
The Wyoming Residential Property Act, in plain terms, states that 
every residential lease in Wyoming contains an implied warranty ofhabita­
bility. "Each owner and his agent renting or leasing a residential rental unit 
shall maintain that unit in a safe and sanitary condition fit for human habi­
tation."87 
The basic obligation the Act imposes on a landlord is that he provide 
premises that are "in a safe and sanitary condition fit for human 
habitation.'>a8 This statement is quite general and needs explanation if the 
parties are to have a clear idea about the landlord's obligations. As was 
observed earlier,'· courts tend to ascertain the specific obligations imposed 
by the warranty through either of two approaches--either by reference to 
housing codes or by application of a general standard of habitability in fact. 
Since Wyoming does not have a statewide housing code, nor have any cities 
or counties enacted housing codes, reliance on housing codes would provide 
little help in fleshing out the meaning of the term.90 
The legislature could have left the meaning of "safe and sanitary con­
dition fit for human habitation" to be developed by the courts on a case by 
case basis. Instead, the legislature chose to prescribe the minimal elements 
of the warranty itself. To that end, the Act requires that "[ e ]ach residential 
rental unit shall have operational electrical, heating and plumbing, with hot 
and cold running water ... .''9' 
ally reserves the right to reassign the student to another room and to require that the student leave the 
dormitory during holidays or term breaks. See Cook v. University Plaza, 427 N.E.2d 405 (III. App. 
1981). The Act provides that it applies to a person who is a "renter, lessee, tenant or other person enti­
tled under a rental agreement to occupy a residential rental unit to the exclusion of others." WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-21-1201(aXiii) (LEXIS 1999). Since the occupancy must be to the exclusion of others, the 
usual license arrangement in a dormitory may not qualify as a residential rental agreement under the Act. 
86. In terms of policy, however. one is still left wondering why the right to a safe and sanitary 
premises should depend on how long one waits to find permanent living quarters? 
87. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202(a)(LEXIS 1999). 
88. /d. 
89. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
90. Of course, the legislature could have adopted a statewide housing code at the same time that it 
enacted the Residential Rental Property Act. It is quite understandable, however, that in a state such as 
Wyoming with a great diversity of environments, ranging from moderately urban to extremely rural, no 
single standard would fairly and adequately apply across the state. An alternative might have been for 
the legislature to require cities andlor counties, with populations over a certain size, to adopt housing 
codes based on a certain model(s). 
91. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202(a)(LEXIS 1999). The provision of the Utah Act from which the 
Wyoming provision was derived is premised. in large part, on the assumption that local governments 
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Habitable housing in the twenty-first century is different from frontier 
housing or even housing of sixty or seventy years ago. Even in the most 
rural settings, tenants are entitled to expect hot and cold running water in­
side their unit. Similarly, they can expect that indoor plumbing will allow 
for waste disposal in a sanitary fashion. Each residential unit should also be 
warmed by some form of heating facility'l that is safe and adequate to heat 
the living space. Finally, it is unimaginable that in today's world any 
structure claimed by the owner to be habitable would not have an electrical 
wiring system. Most of today's common household amenities, including 
lighting, refrigeration, some cooking facilities, and radios and televisions, 
operate on electrical power.93 
Another section of the Act provides further clarification of the land­
lord's duties. It states: 
To protect the physical health and safety of the renter, each owner 
shall: 
(i) 	 Not rent the residential rental unit unless it is reasonably 
safe, sanitary and fit for human occupancy; 
(ii) 	 Maintain common areas of the residential rental unit in a 
sanitary and reasonably safe condition; 
(iii) 	 Maintain electrical systems, plumbing, heating and hot and 
cold water; and 
(iv) 	 Maintain other appliances and facilities as specifically con­
tracted in the rental agreement." 
Clause (i) is a restatement of the basic characteristics of the implied 
warranty of habitability. Clause (iii) restates the minimal elements of that 
warranty. Clause (ii) expands the warranty beyond the physical premises 
rented by the tenant into the "common areas of the residential unit." Were it 
not for the definition of a residential rental unit provided elsewhere in the 
Act,os this would be an interesting, if not a confusing term. How can a 
common area be an actual part of the residential unit? It is normally con­
ceived as an area outside the residential unit itself and serving or providing 
have adopted housing codes. Thus, it provides that the premises must be "in accordance with local 
ordinances and the rules of the board of health having jurisdiction in the area in which the residential 
rental unit is located." Each residential rental unit shall have electrical systems, heating, plumbing, and 
hot and cold water." UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-3(1) (1999). 
92. Usually a modem heating unit is powered by gas or electric, but other methods might be reason· 
able as long as the living space is adequately and safely heated. 
93. The Act does not state who is expected to supply the electric power itself. It seems probable, 
however, that such was not intended as an obligation of the landlord. It appears that a word, such as 
"systems" was inadvertently dropped after the word "electrical." That word is contained in the Utah 
Act. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22·3(1) (1999). In fact, in a subsequent section of the Act the word "sys­
tems" is used in the same general context, albeit with a slightly different order of words. WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-21-1203(a)(iii)(LEXIS 1999). 
94. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203(a)(LEXIS 1999). 
95. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1201(a)(iv)(LEXIS 1999). 
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common access to multiple residential units. However, the defmition of a 
residential rental unit states that common areas are treated as part of the 
rental unit itself." Thus, for example, the landlord must provide safe and 
sanitary hallways, stairs, elevators, and parking lots in order to comply with 
the warranty. Finally, clause (iv) provides that any additional appliances or 
facilities included as part of the leased premises must be maintained by the 
landlord. Usually the lease of an apartment, and sometimes a home, will 
include a refrigerator, a stove and/or an oven, all as part of the rented prem­
ises. If so, those items also must be maintained by the landlord. 
Any meaning of habitability beyond these explicit provisions is left to 
be developed by the courts. It is easy to see that the basic characteristics of 
a safe and sanitary unit might require that development. For example, bro­
ken windows, rotted floor joists, and the presence of rats and other vermin 
do not conform with safe and sanitary housing. Since they do not seem to 
be included within the wording of the Act itself, the courts will have to pro­
vide that interpretation. How far such development of the meaning of 
habitability will extend must be left to the courts on a case by case basis.97 
The Act contains a materiality test, which requires that an alleged 
breach of the implied warranty must be material before the tenant is entitled 
to any remedies. More specifically, it provides that the Act "does not apply 
to breakage, malfunctions or other conditions which do not materially affect 
the physical health or safety of the ordinary renter."98 The purpose of this 
provision is to state that there must be more than a passing malfunction in 
order for an actionable breach of the implied warranty to arise. It recog­
nizes that everyone experiences, on a more or less regular basis, problems 
with their living quarters that do not have a material affect on the tenant's 
physical health and safety. For example, a heating unit on a stove or oven 
may malfunction. If the malfunction is temporary, it is not likely to have 
any material affect on the physical health and safety of the premises. A 
more significant problem might involve a loss of heat in the dwelling unit. 
Again, it is not uncommon that a starter unit on a gas furnace will malfunc­
tion and cause a loss of heat for a short time. As long as a repairperson is 
promptly summoned and is able to fix the unit, there is no breach of the 
implied warranty. However, if the landlord delays too long in summoning 
the repairperson or if the unit can not be fixed, and the short time runs into a 
96. WYo. STAT. ANN. § l-2l-l201(a)(iv) (LEXIS 1999) defines the residential rental unit as in­
cluding "the appurtenances, grounds, common areas and facilities held out for the occupancy of the 
residential renter generally and any other area or facility provided to the renter in the rental agreement 
" 
97. Although the number of Wyoming cases interpreting the doctrine of constructive eviction is very 
small, the courts should treat the protections provided by that doctrine as the beginning point fOT the 
development of protection under the implied warranty of habitability. Indeed, some of the traditional 
examples of the breach of the covenant quiet enjoyment involved lack of heat, hot and cold running 
water, and adequate plumbing; these are also listed in the Act 
98. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202(c) (LEXIS 1999). 
2000 RESIDENTIAL RENTAL PROPERTY ACT 475 
longer time, the otherwise minor and nonmaterial malfunction can become a 
material one that will breach the implied warranty. 
The Act provides another understandable limitation of the landlord's 
duties. "The owner shall not be required to correct or remedy any condition 
caused by the renter, the renter's family, or the renter's guests or invitees by 
inappropriate use or misuse of the property during the rental term or any 
extension of it.'''' For example, if the tenant, his family, or guests cause 
damage to the plumbing facilities or inappropriately disposes of garbage, 
the landlord need not fix the condition. However, landlords who want to 
maintain the value of their property will perform the repair even though not 
required to do so. The damage caused by the tenant may be grounds for 
terminating the lease under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act. IOO In any 
event, the Act provides that the landlord may apply any deposit to the pay­
ment of "damages to the residential rental unit ... [and] the cost to clean the 
unit. ..."101 If the deposit is insufficient to cover the damages, the "owner 
may take any legal action available to recover damages caused to the unit by 
the renter."I02 
2. Waiver/disclaimer. 
Although setting out a clear duty for the landlord to supply habitable 
housing, the Act also allows the landlord to reduce the duties it imposes. In 
two separate provisions, the Act allows the parties to the rental agreement to 
modify or shift the obligations imposed on the landlord. The first provi­
sion-a continuation of the sentence listing the minimal elements of habita­
bility-allows the parties to agree to change the landlord's duties as fol­
lows: "Each residential rental unit shall have operational electrical, heating 
and plumbing, with hot and cold running water unless otherwise agreed 
upon in writing by both parties. "103 The second provision states that "[a ]ny 
duty or obligation in this article may be assigned to a different party or 
modified by explicit written agreement signed by the parties. "104 It is not 
clear why both provisions are needed or even appropriate. The second pro­
vision, although worded somewhat differently and applying more broadly, 
seems to provide adequate authority for the parties to modify landlord's 
obligations. The Utah Fit Premises Act, from which the Wyoming Act was 
derived, does not contain the first provision. 103 It apparently was added in 
the legislative process without consideration that the second provision al­
99. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203(c)(LEXIS 1999). 
100. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1002(a)(vi) (LEXIS 1999). 
101. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(a) (LEXIS 1999). To the same effect, see WYo. STAT. ANN. § 
1-21-211(b)(LEXIS 1999). 
102. Id. 
103. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202(a)(LEXIS I 999)(emphasis added). 
104. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202(d) (LEXIS 1999) (emphasis added). 
105. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-3(1) (1999). It does, however, contain the second waiver provision. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-3(4) (1999). 
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ready existed in the bill and without forethought of the confusion it would 
engender. Nevertheless, the wording is different and both need to be con­
sidered. 
Before analyzing the two provisions, it will be helpful to discuss the 
two alternative conceptual premises upon which implied warranties are 
built. That discussion will provide some insight into when warranties may 
be waived by the parties. Warranties can either be implied in fact or im­
plied in law. When a warranty is implied in fact, the court is seeking to 
determine the actual intent of the parties to the agreement. If the parties 
were not sufficiently clear as to whether a warranty was intended, the court 
will review the words employed, read the four corners of the document for 
evidence of their true intent, allow parole evidence to explain an ambiguity, 
and ultimately make a decision on their actual intent. If a warranty is im­
plied in fact, it is the result of what the parties actually intended and not the 
result of any policy expression by the court. In a future agreement on the 
same subject, the parties may avoid the court's interpretation simply by 
drafting language that clearly negates the warranty the court found in the 
case. 
By comparison, when a warranty is implied in law the court is actually 
making a policy statement. In effect it is stating that, under a particular set 
of circumstances and with certain policy considerations in mind, the actual 
expression of intent of the parties is not controlling. Public policy demands 
that the agreement be interpreted as containing an implied promise by one 
of the parties.'06 For example, as stated previously,'·7 courts will imply a 
covenant of quiet enjoyment in a lease. That covenant will be implied re­
gardless of an attempt by the landlord to state that such a covenant is ex­
cluded. In order to protect a tenant from premises that are so substantially 
impaired as to amount to an eviction, the covenant is implied as a matter of 
policy. Since the court has made its decision as a matter of public policy, 
the parties in any future agreement may not alter the interpretation by spe­
cifically absolving a party from performing that duty. Such a disclaimer 
would be contrary to the policy considerations that led the court to adopt the 
warranty implied in law. Expressed differently, why would the court have 
gone to the effort of establishing the policy in the first place if it could be 
overruled merely by one party inserting a term negating the protection? 
However, if the foundational policy assumptions upon which the court 
based its adoption of a warranty implied in law in the first place are 
changed, then the prior decision implying a warranty no longer applies and 
the parties should be free to negotiate a waiver. For example, if an exami­
106. In this sense, the use of the term "implied warranty" may be a misnomer. Instead, it could be 
referred to as a policy based obligation of one of the parties. 
107. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text. 
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nation of the bargaining positions of the landlord and the tenant demon­
strates that the tenant is in a superior position to the landlord, there is no 
reason why the tenant should not be able to negotiate a waiver of the war­
ranty. 
When the issue has arisen, most courts have treated the implied war­
ranty of habitability as a warranty implied in law.'08 It is a policy of the 
court that the tenant should have the basic protections provided by the war­
ranty. Since one of the policy considerations for adopting the implied war­
ranty in the first place was a lack of equal bargaining posture between a 
landlord and a tenant, a landlord should not be allowed to abuse that ine­
quality by disclaiming the warranty in his next rental agreement. 
Provisions in the Wyoming Act raise a question about whether the Act 
establishes the warranty as implied in law or only as implied in fact On its 
face, the Act appears to provide that the parties may waive or shift the 
landlord's duties in whatever fashion the written lease explicitly provides. 
However, as will be discussed, the ability to disclaim the duties under the 
Act may be limited and it may not be possible for the landlord to modify or 
shift his duties quite so easily. A reasonable interpretation of the waiver 
provisions may allow the landlord to disclaim the warranty only when the 
fundamental policy considerations that led to the adoption of an implied 
warranty originally are not present. If the provisions are interpreted in that 
fashion the warranty created by the Act will still be considered as implied in 
law.''' If the warranty is freely and easily disclaimable, then it must be con­
sidered as implied in fact. 
For example, if the landlord and tenant are actually in a relatively equal 
bargaining position and the landlord gives genuine consideration for the 
waiver, there may be no reason to apply the warranty in the first place. The 
landlord and tenant are each able to protect their interests and should be 
allowed to negotiate to the ends that best fit their needs."· However, given 
the general inequality in bargaining positions of residential tenants and their 
landlords, that is not a common situation and proof of the equality should be 
required. 
The more general of the two provisions in the Act allowing for a 
waiver of landlord's duties provides that "[a]ny duty or obligation in this 
article may be assigned to a different party or modified by explicit written 
\08. Javins, 428 F.2d at \081-82; Hilder, 478 A.2d at 208. 
109. But see Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658, 668 (Mass. 1991), where the court stated that the 
landlord cannot nullify an implied warranty by giving the tenant a discount in the rent. 
110. See, e.g., Johnson v. Scandia Ass'n., Inc., 717 N.E.2d 24,30-31 (Ind. 1994). Even when bar­
gaining has occurred, if the waiver actually creates a dangerous situation for the tenant or third parties, 
then other fundamental policy considerations may be involved, and the tenant may not be allowed to 
waive the warranty. See Haddad, 576 N.E.2d at 668 (Mass. 199\); Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 164­
65 (Wash. 1973). 
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agreement signed by the parties.""' How should the word "explicit" be in­
terpreted? Does "explicit" simply mean "written?" If so, all that the lease 
agreement would need to contain is a written provision stating that the war­
ranty was waived. For example, a simple boilerplate provision stating that 
the tenant takes the premises "as is" or that the "tenant hereby waives all 
warranties" can negate the warranty. However, that interpretation seems 
doubtful and inappropriate for several reasons. 
First, if the word "explicit" merely meant "written," there would have 
been no need for the legislature to state that the waiver must be "explicit." 
The provision already states that the waiver must be written. All the provi­
sion would mean is the waiver must be by "written agreement." Obviously, 
that was not intended. Therefore, the word "explicit" must mean something 
more demanding. 
Second, the language of the section gives some idea of what the legis­
lature was intending. Not only does the provision deal with modification of 
the landlord's duties, but also deals with assigning them to a different party. 
The only other party to whom the landlord's duties could be assigned is the 
tenant. This brings to mind situations in which the tenant, in consideration 
for a reduction in rent or some other benefit, is willing to accept that obliga­
tion and waive his rights under the Act. To be fair to basic contract con­
cepts, however, that assignment should not be presumed unless the tenant 
knowingly accepts the assignment. As if to emphasize that fact, the provi­
sion requires the assignment or modification be made by "explicit" lan­
guage. Any failure of the lease explicitly to identify the obligation being 
modified or assigned is not in compliance. Thus, any language of general 
disclaimer, acceptance of the premises "as is," or language that does not 
draw the attention of the tenant to the "explicit" defect involved is insuffi­
cient to meet the requirements of the statute. 
Justice Thomas, of the Wyoming Supreme Court, dissenting in a recent 
case, called attention to the same issue regarding a tort disclaimer in a real 
estate contract: 
As a matter of public policy, disclaimers in contracts will not be 
honored unless the disclaimer is specific with respect to the tort dis­
claimed, and it is apparent that an express bargain was stuck to 
forgo the possibility of tort recovery in exchange for negotiated al­
ternative economic damages. . .. The waiver of tort liability by the 
purchaser in such a contract is permitted, but only with knowledge 
and if bargained for in the exchange.1I2 
111. 	 WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202(d)(LEXIS 1999). 
112. Richey v. Patrick. 904 P.2d 798, 810 (Wyo. 1995). 
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Finally, given the fact that the legislature went to the effort of adopting 
an implied warranty, why would it allow a landlord to negate it so easily? 
Since we now have a statute imposing an implied warranty on the landlord, 
we no longer have a "bare table" on which there are no presumptions. III 
There is now a presumption of an implied warranty. A waiver should be 
permitted only if the policy reasons for adopting the warranty in the lirst 
place have not occurred in the particular landlord tenant situation. 
Perhaps the most significant policy reason for treating residential 
leases differently than other leases and implying a warranty is that residl:ll­
tial tenants usually are not in an equal bargaining position with their land­
lord and the implied warranty tends to even out the bargaining field. Thus, 
it would be appropriate to inquire whether the landlord and tenant were in a 
position of actual even-handed negotiations over the exclusion of the war­
ranty. Was the tenant aware of the defect for which the landlord is dis­
claiming responsibility? Does the wording of the waiver draw the attention 
of the tenant to a specific defect, or is the defect a latent one? Was there 
consideration for the waiver? If the response to these questions is in the 
negative, it seems inappropriate to allow the landlord to disclaim his statuto­
rily imposed duties. 
This approach supports the basic purposes behind the adoption of the 
implied warranty. Iflandlords must disclose the precise defect that is being 
waived, the stock of habitable housing in the state will be enhanced. II. If 
they have the choice, tenants will generally choose not to rent a defective 
apartment. Explicit disclosure should encourage the landlord to make the 
repair and, as a result, will improve the stock of habitable housing. In other 
words, the economics of the marketplace should encourage the maintenance 
and improvement to the stock of habitable dwellings in the state. 
The other provision regarding waivers is less clear regarding the need 
for specific language. It provides that "[e]ach residential unit shall have 
electrical, heating and plumbing, with hot and cold running water unless 
otherwise agreed upon in writing by both parties."'" 
113. The Wyoming Supreme Court has enforced general waivers or "as is" clauses in other situations. 
However, those clauses usually arose in contracts that were not the subject of legislation creating any 
assumptions, i.e., there truly was a "bare table" on which the parties could act. For example, parties to a 
real estate contract are often viewed as being in equal bargaining positions and may waive their rights as 
they see fit. Richey, 904 P.2d at 803; Schepps v. Howe, 665 P.2d 504, 509 (Wyo. 1983). However, 
when the contract of sale is between a builder/developer and a buyer, the court has found an implied 
warranty of habitability. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735-36 (Wyo. 1979); Tavares 
v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Wyo. 1975). Since there is now a presumption of an implied war­
ranty, the table is no longer bare. Presumably, the court will not allow the implied warranty of the 
builder/developer to be waived lightly by general disclaimers. 
114. Enhancement of the stock of habitable housing is also a policy reason for adopting the implied 
warranty of habitability. 
115. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21·1202(a)(LEXIS I 999)(emphasis added). 
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The sentence begins by requiring certain amenities but allows one or 
more of them to be waived by an agreement in writing. Nevertheless, it 
does not allow a general waiver of the warranty itself; it only allows the 
waiver of specific amenities, if agreed to in writing. To be in compliance 
with the requirements of this section, the lease agreement must at least 
mention that the disclaimer involves electrical, heating, plumbing and/or hot 
and cold running water. If it purports to affect more than those specific 
amenities, it attempts to do more than the Act allows. Furthermore, this 
section does not allow general disclaimers or "as is" clauses. An "as is" 
clause affects, or potentially affects, more than the listed amenities. 
Unlike the previously discussed provision, this section would appear to 
allow waiver of the listed types of amenities without specifying the explicit 
defect involved. For example, although this provision does not allow a 
waiver of all warranties, it may allow a waiver of "all warranties concerning 
heating of the leased premises." That disclaimer is not as explicit as is re­
quired by the prior provision. As so interpreted, it would allow landlords to 
insert boilerplate disclaimers mentioning the listed amenities. Landlords 
would be able to obviate most of the significant provisions of the Act sim­
ply by including such boilerplate disclaimers. 
It is also interesting to note that such a loose interpretation of this pro­
vision would allow a disclaimer of the most central habitability elements by 
general language, while other habitability issues'l6 which may not be so 
central, would need the explicit language required by the more general pro­
vision.1I7 The courts could avoid this incongruity. They could interpret the 
requirements of the more demanding provision as controlling, since it is 
more specific. 
Some examination of lease language as interpreted under both of these 
provisions might be helpful. Consider the following examples: 
(1) ''The tenant accepts the premises as is" or "the tenant waives all 
implied warranties as created by law." This language is not sufficiently 
specific to qualify for an explicit disclaimer, nor does it mention the specific 
amenities and, thus, does not qualify for the more general disclaimer. Fur­
thermore, in neither case is the tenant's attention drawn to the defect in­
volved. If the defect currently exists and is known to the landlord, he 
should not be allowed to absolve himself by failing to disclosing the defect. 
He would be laying a trap for a legally unsophisticated tenant. 
(2) "The tenant waives all implied warranties to provide heat to the 
premises." In this case, there is a mention of the specific type of amenity 
116. Such as broken windows, rotted floor joists, and infestations by rodents or vermin. 
117. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202(d)(LEXIS 1999). 
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being disclaimed and it is one of those listed in the statute, but there is no 
indication that the tenant was advised as to an "explicit" defect and allowed 
to evaluate it. IIB Nor is there is any indication that the tenant was given any 
consideration for the waiver.1I9 This example does not qualify under the 
provision requiring explicit language in the waiver. However, it might 
qualify under the more general provision since it does mention the specific 
type of amenity being disclaimed. 
(3) "The tenant hereby recognizes that the furnace in the house does 
not operate and in consideration for a reduction in the rent agrees to fix the 
furnace and supply her own heat." This reassignment of duties is explicit. 
It mentions not only the fact that it involves heat, but also clearly identifies 
the explicit defect. The tenant is given information that she can evaluate 
and upon which she can make a decision. She is also given consideration 
for accepting the assignment of the duties that would otherwise be placed on 
the landlord; thus, it qualifies under either provision. 
D. Tenant's Remedies 
As noted previously,'20 the Wyoming courts have recognized two tradi­
tional remedies that have been historically available to tenants---damages 
and termination (constructive eviction). Normally when courts or legisla­
tures have established an implied warranty of habitability they have added 
either or both of two additional remedies-rent abatement and repair and 
offset. The interesting thing about the Wyoming statute is that it makes no 
particular reference to either of these remedies. In addition, it makes almost 
no reference to the tenant's right to terminate for a substantial breach of the 
landlord's duties. 12I It does, however, set forth an extended procedure that 
the tenant must follow in order to recover damages from the landlord. 122 
After discussing the tenant's ability to recover damages under this provi­
sion, I will consider the continuing availability of the remedy of termination 
(constructive eviction), and the possible availability of other remedies in the 
absence of specific authority in the statute. 
The procedures specified in the Act for a tenant to recover damages are 
long and arduous. Because they are, for the most part, unnecessary, they 
118. The tenant should be allowed to evaluate whether the lack of heat will be occasional or contin­
ual, whether it affects the entire premises or only an unimportant or unused portion of the unit, and 
whether it is a current defect or only a potential one for the future. Of course, if it currently exists and 
that fact is not disclosed, such failure to disclose could be considered a misrepresentation. 
119. Of course, the actual rent paid and other benefits received under the lease agreement should be 
examined to make this determination. 
120. See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text. 
121. The Act does refer to termination as one of the remedies a court may grant as a result of litiga­
tion. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1206(c) (LEXIS 1999). However. it does not refer to the right of a 
tenant to assert that a constructive eviction has occurred resulting in the termination of the lease without 
a prior court order. 
122. The court may also grant affirmative relief as a consequence of the action. Jd. 
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actually appear to be designed to discourage a tenant from suing her land­
lord. 123 The process involves three separate steps, with two written notices 
to the landlord occurring over an extended period of time. The ability to 
recover damages has never been a speedy one, but under the Act, simply 
getting into the courtroom can be a lengthy and precarious process. 124 
Step 1. As a prerequisite even to requesting that the landlord perform 
his duties under the lease, the tenant must be "current on all payments re­
quired by the rental agreement. "12' In effect, this language states that the 
tenant does not even have a right to begin the remedial process by asking 
that the landlord correct a defective condition if the tenant is not then cur­
rent in her rent payments. What harm could result from a delinquent tenant 
making such a request? Why should a landlord be allowed to jeopardize the 
health and safety of the tenant and her family just because the tenant is not 
current in her rental payments? Indeed, the reason for the nonpayment may 
very well be the fact that the landlord has refused to repair the condition. If 
the tenant, in breach of the lease, has truly defaulted in her rent payments, 
the landlord's proper remedy is to evict the tenant under the proper statutory 
procedures, not to perpetuate his own default by refusing to correct the un­
safe or unsanitary condition. 
The second prerequisite in order for the tenant to request that the land­
lord correct a defect is that the tenant must have "reasonable cause sup­
ported by evidence to believe the residential rental unit does not comply 
with the standards for health and safety required under this article ...."". 
Certainly if the tenant wants to be successful in obtaining relief, it makes 
sense that she have reasonable cause to believe there is a defect before she 
requests the landlord to correct it; but there is no reason to make it a prereq­
uisite for seeking relief. If there is no reasonable cause, the landlord can 
simply dispute the tenant's claim. The Act specifically provides a proce­
dure by which the landlord may interpose that dispute.127 By making rea­
sonable cause a specific prerequisite the legislature may have created more 
problems than it solved. May a landlord refuse to make a repair that is 
needed because, at the time the tenant made the request she could not dem­
onstrate reasonable cause? The language is even more confusing by the fact 
123. The notice and remedy procedures under the Utah Fit Premises Act are, in most respects, the 
same as those in the Wyoming Residential Rental Property Act. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-22-4(2); -6(2); 
(6)(3) (1999). 
124. Since jurisdiction is given to the county courts and the justice of the peace courts, the normal 
dilatory process of discovery can be avoided. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1206(c)(LEXIS 1999). In that 
sense, the remedy may be quicker. However, if the tenant is seeking damages that exceed the jurisdic­
tional amount of those courts, she will have to bring suit in the District Court, apparently after following 
the same notice procedures. Id. 
125. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203(b) (LEXIS 1999). This requirement is not part of the Utah Fit 
Premises Act. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-4(2) (1999). 
126. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203(b) (LEXIS 1999). 
127. Id. 
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that the reasonable cause must be supported by evidence. What kind of 
evidence is required? Is it sufficient that there is no heat in fact? Does the 
tenant have to produce evidence about the defect itself, such as a defective 
burner in the heating unit? Since the heating unit may be in an area to 
which only the landlord has access, it may be impossible for the tenant to 
obtain further evidence. The only reasonable interpretation of this language 
is that the lack of heat is sufficient evidence by itself of the landlord's fail­
ure to comply with the Act, which enables the tenant to lodge the 
complaint. 12B 
After satisfying the prerequisites, the tenant's first step is to "advise the 
owner in writing of the condition and specify the remedial action the renter 
requests be taken by the owner."12. The subsection further provides that 
"notices required by this subsection shall be served by certified mail or in 
the manner specified by W.S. 1-21-1003.""0 The referenced section of the 
Wyoming statutes provides, in pertinent part, that a notice may be served 
"by leaving a written copy with the defendant or at his usual place of abode 
or business if he cannot be found."1lI Thus, the notice must state what con­
dition is in violation of the implied warranty and specify the remedial action 
the tenant requests. For the reasons stated in the prior paragraph, the speci­
ficity of the remedial action should not be beyond the tenant's abilities. A 
tenant, who is not likely to have technical knowledge about the precise re­
medial action needed to cure the defect, should be allowed to specify that 
the landlord remedy the consequences of the breach rather than the specific 
defect itself. For example, if there is no heat in the premises, the tenant may 
not know whether the defect is in the furnace, the heat ducts or pipes, or in 
some other part of the unit. It should be sufficient that the tenant specify the 
remedial action needed is to "restore the heat." 
Most tenants, especially at this stage of the matter, have not visited an 
attorney and may not realize that they must deliver the notice in writing, by 
either certified mail or personal delivery. One may question whether a 
landlord should be able to deny any obligation to fix a substantial defect 
simply because the tenant notified him personally. Good faith should re­
quire that even if the landlord received the notice orally, he should none­
theless respond to and fix the defect. 
After receiving the notice, the landlord has a reasonable time to re­
spond. His response may take either of two approaches. "Within a reason­
able time after the receipt of this notice, the owner shall either commence 
128. If the lack of heat is not the result of a violation of the landlord's duty to provide safe and sani­




13\. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1003 (LEXIS 1999). 
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action to correct the condition of the residential unit or notify the renter in 
writing that the owner disputes the owner's claim."132 The landlord's notice 
of dispute also must be delivered either by certified mail or by personal 
service on the tenant at her place of abode or business. Understandably, 
there is no definition of "reasonable time" for the landlord's response. The 
amount of time that is reasonable will vary depending on the severity of the 
defect. For example, a reasonable time to correct a lack of heat in the sum­
mer will be considerably longer than in the winter. Similarly, a reasonable 
time to fix a broken window pane may be longer than the time needed to fix 
a broken water pipe. 
Step 2. If the landlord does not respond within a reasonable time by 
correcting the defect, the tenant must move to the second step in enforcing 
the warranty.133 However, there is again a prerequisite, this time to enforc­
ing the warranty-the tenant must be "in compliance with the provisions"'''' 
of the Act regarding her duties'" and prohibitions.'3. For example, she must 
"be current on all payments required by the rental agreement"l37 and she 
may not "intentionally or negligently destroy, deface, damage, impair or 
remove any part of the ... unit. ..."138 
Once again, this provision appears to place unnecessary impediments 
on achieving the benefits of the implied warranty created by the Act. If the 
premises are, in fact, unsafe or unsanitary and not fit for human habitation, 
the fact that the tenant has failed to pay her rent has little or no bearing on 
whether the landlord should comply with the warranty. Indeed, the very 
reason why she has not paid the rent may be because the landlord has 
breached the warranty. The tenant should be allowed to obtain relief and, if 
any rent is yet due to the landlord, the amount can be set off from the ten­
ant's recovery. 
Similarly, the mere fact that the tenant may have caused some injury to 
the premises does not mean the tenant should be denied relief, at least if the 
damage is immaterial and unrelated to the breach. Otherwise an ordinary 
and inconsequential scratch on a countertop might be argued to be grounds 
132. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203(b)(LEXIS (999). 
133. If the landlord disputes tenant's claim, the tenant may move directly to the third step and com­
mence legal action. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1206(c) (LEX IS 1999). 
134. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1206(a)(LEXIS (999). 
135. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1204 (LEXIS (999). For a more complete discussion, see infra notes 
201-18 and accompanying text. 
136. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-\205 (LEXIS 1999). For a more complete discussion, see infra notes 
219-28 and accompanying text. 
137. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1204(a)(i) (LEX IS (999). 
138. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1205(a)(i)(LEXIS 1999). 
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for denying relief. If there is some damage to the premises, the cost of re­
pairing it can be offset from any recovery the tenant will receive.'" 
Prior to commencing a legal proceeding the tenant must, once again, 
notify the landlord of the defect and demand that it be repaired. That notice 
must again be delivered by certified mail or personal service. It must also 
contain an enumeration of the prior demands and defects that have not been 
corrected. 
If a reasonable time has elapsed after the renter has served written no­
tice on the owner under W.S. 1-21-1203 and the owner has failed to respond 
or to correct the condition described in the notice, the renter may cause a 
"notice to repair or correct condition" to be prepared and served on the 
owner by certified mail or in the manner specified by W.S. 1-21-1003. This 
notice shall: 
(i) 	 Recite the previous notice served under W.S. 1-21-1203(b); 
(ii) 	 State the number of days that have elapsed since the notice 
was served and that under the circumstances the period of 
time constitutes the reasonable time allowed under W.S. 1­
21-1203(b); 
(iii) 	 State the conditions included in the previous notice which 
have not been corrected: 
(iv) 	 Demand that the uncorrected conditions be corrected; and 
(v) 	 State that if the owner fails to commence reasonable cor­
rective action within three (3) days he will seek redress in 
the courts. 
Most of the elements of this notice seem unnecessarily burdensome and 
a trap for the normal legally unsophisticated residential tenant. The land­
lord has already received a notice of the defects under Step I of this process. 
The first four listed items in the second notice are a repeat of the informa­
tion the landlord received in the first notice or deal with information about 
which the landlord must be already aware-that the first notice was served, 
that a reasonable time has elapsed since the prior notice was served, that the 
condition has not been corrected, and that the tenant is demanding that it be 
corrected. Since the landlord has received the first notice, he already knows 
that he has received it and the length of time that has transpired. A state­
ment that a reasonable time has elapsed since the date of service is self­
serving on the part of the tenant. The severity of the defect will be apparent 
to the landlord and he should know that a reasonable time has transpired. If 
the landlord has not corrected the defects requested in the first notice, he 
also is, or should be, aware of that fact. Even the final item should be obvi­
139. See Wolin v. Walker. 830 P.2d 429. 433-34 (Wyo. (992). 
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ous to the landlord-that the tenant will commence an action to seek re­
dress.'" 
However, there is one advantage of a second notice, although there is no 
reason for the notice to be so cumbersome and dilatory. The landlord may 
believe that he has, in fact, corrected the defect, and the tenant may believe 
to the contrary. If so, it would be helpful if the landlord discovered that 
fact. Nonetheless, an additional written notice seems an lUlllecessary for­
mality, especially if there has been no attempt at correction by the landlord. 
The landlord can easily check with the tenant upon completion of the repair, 
or shortly thereafter, to ascertain the tenant's views. 
The requirement that the notice be served by certified mail or by per­
sonal service also seems to be a trap for the legally unsophisticated tenant. 
If a tenant delivers the notice to the landlord by ordinary mail and it is actu­
ally received, it should not matter how the notice was received. For that 
matter, if the tenant can prove that the landlord has received oral notice of 
the defect, the landlord should not be able to complain that he was not given 
an opportunity to correct the defect. 
Most implied warranties have been created through the judicial process. 
In creating those warranties, courts have also required the landlord be given 
notice of the defect and have an opportunity to cure it. However, they sel­
dom have provided any rigidity about the content of the notice or the 
method of its delivery. If the landlord had actual notice of the defect and 
failed to cure it, then the tenant may seek appropriate remedies. Perhaps 
more importantly, these courts do not require that the tenant give the land­
lord essentially the same notice twice. '4' 
Step 3. If, after giving the "notice to repair or correct condition" and 
waiting the mandatory three days, the landlord "has not corrected or used 
due diligence to correct the conditions, ... or if the owner has notified the 
renter that the claim is disputed, ..."'42 the tenant may commence an action 
against the landlord in the county or justice of the peace court. The action 
will then be tried within a period of three to twenty days after the service of 
the summons. '43 
If the landlord has been unreasonable in refusing to correct the condi­
tion or has not used due diligence to perform the correction, "the renter may 
140. To require that the tenant give the landlord three additional days to correct in all circumstances is 
also unnecessarily rigid. Some defects pose such a danger or so significantly breach the warranty that 
imposing a three day wait for any relief is unreasonable. One can imagine many such situations: A gas 
leak in the furnace, a break in the water pipes, or even the lack of heat in the winter. 
141. See generally Marini v. ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (N.J. 1970); Hilder, 478 A.2d at 210. 
142. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1206(c)(LEXIS 1999). 
143. ld. 
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be awarded costs, damages, and affirmative relief as determined by the 
COurt."I44 It should be noted that the damages available to the tenant do not 
include attorney's fees. The original version of the bill introduced in the 
legislature in the 1999 session allowed reasonable attorney's fees to be col­
lected as part of the damages}" The availability of attorney's fees was, in 
the view of some, a balancing provision}" Without the ability to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees, the expectation of compensation may be so low 
that most tenants will find the cost of prosecuting the suit to be prohibitive. 
Unless the tenant has sufficient personal resources to afford an attorney and 
pursue the case on principle, or unless an attorney is willing to accept the 
case on a pro bono basis, the tenant will have to prosecute the case pro se. 
More likely, the inability to recover attorney's fees from the offending 
landlord will simply have the effect of squelching relief in many cases. 
Unfortunately, these cases may include some of the most serious breaches 
of the implied warranty. 
The damages to be awarded to the tenant "may include rent improperly 
retained or collected" by the landlord. I' 7 During the period in which the 
premises are not habitable, the landlord fails to provide the tenant with some 
or all of the consideration that he promised she would receive-habitable 
housing. Since the obligations of the parties are mutually dependent, the 
failure of the landlord to supply his consideration means that he has im­
properly retained or collected some of the rent. l .. To the extent that the 
premises have been devalued by the breach of the implied warranty, the 
landlord has failed to supply his consideration. As a consequence, the 
landlord has received rent from the tenant that is improperly retained or 
collected. 
There have been several approaches to computing damages in implied 
warranty of habitability cases. The traditional method of determining com­
pensatory damages is to compute the difference between the fair rental 
value of the premises in their warranted condition and the fair rental value 
of the premises in their actual condition. 1.9 This method, as traditionally 
stated, requires some evidence of the value of the premises in both states. ISO 
144. [d. 
145. Wyo. House Bill No. HB 0044 (1999). 
146. Interview with State Senator Phillip Nicholas (Jan. 19,2000). 
147. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1206(c)(LEXIS 1999). 
148. See Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17,22 (N.J. 1973). 
149. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 
293 N.E.2d 831, 845 (Mass. 1973); Von Pettis Realty, Inc. v. McKoy, 519 S.E.2d 546,549 (N.C. App. 
1999); Hilder, 478 A.2d at 209. If the tenant vacates the premises and terminates the lease, the tenant is 
no longer injured by the continuing condition of the premises. As a consequence, courts have limited the 
relief after termination to the difference between the promised rent and the fair market value as prom­
ised. This amount is likely to be very small in residential leases and will occur only if the tenant has an 
advantageous lease. Mease, 200 N.W.2d at 797; King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 76 (Mo. App. 
1973). 
ISO. See, e.g.. Kekllas v. Saddy, 389 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759 (N.Y. Misc. 1976). 
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Since the cost of prosecuting a case of this kind is likely to be high for most 
residential tenants, the need to introduce expert testimony about the value of 
the property may prove even more prohibitive. To assist in the determina­
tion of damages, some courts have found it valuable to engage in some ba­
sic valuation assumptions.'si 
In most cases, it is reasonable to assume that the rent promised in the 
lease is the rental value of the premises as promised. Most residential leases 
are relatively short term-sufficiently short so that the rental value is not 
likely to have time to change much, if at all. Thus, it should be permissible 
to accept the rent promised by the tenant in the lease as the best evidence of 
the fair rental value of the premises.'S2 If either the tenant or the landlord 
should have proof that the value is otherwise, they may introduce that evi­
dence.15J In the absence thereof, the fair rental value of the premises in their 
warranted condition may be assumed to be the promised rent. IS< Thus, in 
most residential leases, the damages a tenant incurs when she remains in the 
defective unit is the difference between the rent she promised to pay in the 
lease and the fair rental value of the premises in their actual condition. ISS 
However, simplifying the proof of the fair rental value of the premises 
in their actual condition may not be as easy. Unless the unit is in such terri­
bly poor condition that it can fairly be assumed to have a fair rental value of 
zero, some evidence will have to be introduced to determine its fair rental 
value in its devalued condition. ISO There does not appear to be any readily 
available assumptions that will simplify this process. Presumably, there are 
few, if any, residential units in a similar defective condition with which to 
compare the tenant's unit. There is not a "blue book" of values for residen­
tial units in various states of disrepair. An appraiser might be able to deter­
mine a value for the unit but, without comparables, it is not clear that this 
appraisal would be much better of an estimate than the tenant's would be.1S7 
Given the difficulties involved, a number of cases have accepted reasonable 
approximations. "We agree with plaintiff that expert testimony is not re­
quired ... and an approximation as to the amount of abatement is allowable 
lSI. '''[lIn residential lease disputes involving a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, public 
policy militates against requiring expert testimony' concerning the value of the defect." Hilder, 478 
A.2d at 209 (quoting from Birkenhead v. Coombs, 465 A.2d 244,247 (VI. 1983». 
152. See. e.g .. Breezewood Management Co. v. Maltbie, 411 N.E.2d 670,675 (Ind. App. 1980); Stone 
v. Gordon, 621 N.V.S.2d 220, 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Hilder, 478 A.2d at 209. 
153. Of course it should go without saying that the landlord may not assert that the rental value of the 
premises has decreased because of the defective condition that is the basis for the breach of the warranty. 
The change in the rental value must arise because of the effect of independent market forces upon the 
value of the residential unit. 
154. Because there is so little time for the rental value to fluctuate during a short term residential 
lease, some courts have stated that the fair rental value of the premises in their warranted condition is, as 
a matter oflaw, the rent promised in the lease. See Kline v. Bums, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (N.H. 1971). 
155. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: lANDLORD & TENANT §§ 5.5; 10.2 (1977). 
156. See. e.g .. Goldnerv. Doknovitch, 388 N.V.S.2d 504, 507 (N.¥. Sup. App. Term 1976). 
157. See Birkenhead v. Coombs, 465 A.2d 244, 247 (VI. 1983). 
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if a precise determination is not possible."'SB Thus, the landlord and the ten­
ant should be allowed to introduce evidence from whatever sources are 
available to them. 159 The finder of fact must then evaluate the evidence and 
come to a reasonable detennination of damages. '60 
The calculation of the tenant's injury should also include consequential 
and incidental damages. ,., For example, additional items such as the ten­
ant's expenses to live in alternative housing (e.g., a motel) during the period 
of the defect and her damages due to physical injury or sickness resulting 
from the unsafe or unsanitary condition should be included as part of her 
damages.'62 However, the Act explicitly states that the landlord "is not li­
able under this article for claims for mental suffering or anguish."'" 
Finally, the section defmes the additional affirmative relief that the 
court may prescribe. "Affirmative relief may include a declaration tenni­
nating the rental agreement, or an order directing the owner to make reason­
able repairs."'64 Specific performance, although not often employed in a 
breach of an implied warranty action, is an appropriate remedy. As long as 
the court is able to fashion the order properly, specific performance would 
accomplish the ultimate objective of the implied warranty-assurance that 
the residential housing unit is safe, sanitary, and fit for human habitation. It 
158. Bedel v. Los Zapatistas, Inc., 805 P.2d 1198, 1200 (Colo. App. 1991); see also Young v. Patu­
konis, 506 N.E.2d 1164, 1168 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) ("an approximate doIlar amount is pennissible; 
damages in rent abatement cases generally are not capable of precise measurement.") [d.; Teller v. 
McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 128 (W. Va. 1978); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND 
TENANT, § 11.1 cmt. d (\977). 
159. See Birkenhead, 465 A.2d at 247; ct. Leris Realty Corp. v. Robbins, 408 N.Y.S.2d 166, 167 
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978). 
160. See Breezewood Management Co. v. Maltbie, 411 N.E.2d 670, 675 (Ind. App. 1980). Another 
possible means of calculating damages would be to base it on the proportional diminution in the value of 
the rental unit. See. e.g.. Vanlandingham v. Ivanow, 615 N.E.2d 1361, 1369 (Ill. App. 1993); McKenna 
v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548, 552-53 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977). One application of this approach generally 
assumes that each square foot of the residential unit has equal value and the court will calculate the 
reduction in value in a proportionate fashion. In other words, if the defect renders forty percent of the 
premises uninhabitable the value of the premises has also been reduced by forty percent. However, this 
approach would seem to work best if the defect affects a discrete part of the premises. It would be more 
difficult to apply it to defects that more generally affect the entire premises. See Teller, 253 S.E.2d at 
128, stating that the difference in value approach is more widely accepted than the percentage reduction 
in use approach, but in such circumstances, it might be an appropriate method of measuring damages. 
161. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Creekside Apartments v. Poteat, 446 S.E.2d 
826,831 (N.C. App. 1994). 
162. See Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 209 (Vt. 1984). But see Johnson v. Scandia Assoc., Inc., 
717 N.E.2d 24, 32 (Ind. 1999), where the court held that consequential damages were not permined if 
the warranty is implied in fact. 
163. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203(e) (LEX IS 1999). Contra Simon v. Solomon, 431 N.E.2d 556, 
570-71 (Mass. 1982). As will be discussed below, the defective condition of the residential unit may 
give rise to a tort liability for failure to repair as promised in the lease, or due to some other exception to 
the landlord's common law immunity from tort liability. In addition, the breach of the implied warranty 
of habitability may create the foundation for tort liability for the landlord. It would appear that a tort 
recovery in such a situation would not be for a liability "under this article" since this article does not deal 
directly with tort liability. See infra notes 286-95 and accompanying text. 
164. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1206(c)(LEXIS 1999). 
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should not be too difficult for a court to craft an order directing the landlord 
to repair most of the common defective conditions found in a residential 
unit. They are usually discrete and achievable repairs, which are easily 
measured and enforced. As will be discussed below, if repairing the defect 
is impossible or unreasonably expensive in relation to the nature of the 
property or the rent charged, the landlord can terminate the lease.'os Had the 
landlord believed the repairs were unachievable, presumably he would have 
elected to terminate the lease upon receipt of the tenant's initial complaint. 
In the absence of a prior election to terminate, the landlord should not be 
able to claim the repairs are impossible to perform or too difficult to meas­
ure or enforce. 
The court's decree may also terminate the lease. If the lease is termi­
nated, the tenant will be required to "vacate the rental unit no sooner than 
ten (10) days nor later than twenty (20) days after the termination of the 
rental agreement by the court."'" If the court does terminate the lease, the 
tenant is entitled to a refund of the balance of the rent already paid and a 
return of her deposit within thirty days after the effective termination of the 
lease.'·' 
The maximum period of time within which the tenant must vacate 
seems to be very short; it may not allow her sufficient time to fmd a new 
place to live and then move out of the existing one. This provision might be 
especially difficult for tenants in rural areas where nearby housing is mini­
mal and often not readily available for rent or lease. The maximum period 
of time could rightly have been left to the court to determine in its discre­
tion, since only it is in the position to determine a just and equitable termi­
nation process under the facts ofa particular case. 
In authorizing the termination of the lease, the Act makes no specific 
reference to the doctrine of constructive eviction. As discussed above,'68 if 
the tenant is constructively evicted from a leasehold estate she may termi­
nate the lease, and she may do so without prior court intervention. If the 
landlord should thereafter attempt to recover rent from her, she may use the 
doctrine of constructive eviction as a defense. ,69 There does not appear to be 
any reason of logic or convenience to suggest that a specific provision al­
lowing judicial termination of a lease, as additional affirmative relief in a 
lawsuit, was intended to repeal the doctrine of constructive eviction. A 
doctrine so established in our common law as constructive eviction should 
165. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203(d) (LEXIS 1999). See infra notes 171-g0 and accompanying 
text for a further discussion of this provision. 
166. Jd. 
167. Jd. 
16g. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text. 
169. At that time. she will be called upon to prove the correctness of her conclusion that she had been 
constructively evicted. 
2000 RESIDENTIAL RENTAL PROPERTY ACT 491 
not be repealed by anything less than precise and clear language. That lan­
guage is not present here. The Act is supplemental to existing law and 
should not be interpreted to repeal current doctrines without specific refer­
ence. Furthermore, to do so would deny residential tenants the benefits of 
the doctrine while still allowing the doctrine to be used by commercial and 
agricultural tenants."· 
Tennination by landlord due to economic reasons. Some repairs to 
leased premises may be extremely expensive and not economically sound 
for a particular property. Because of that potential, the landlord is given an 
opportunity to evaluate the costs of the repairs needed to bring the residen­
tial unit into compliance with the implied warranty of habitability. If the 
costs are out of proportion to the rents or the value of the property, the Act 
gives the landlord the opportunity to choose not to make the repair and in­
stead to terminate the lease. "The owner may refuse to correct the condition 
of the residential rental unit and terminate the rental agreement if the costs 
of repairs exceeds an amount which would be reasonable in light of the rent 
charged, the nature of the rental property or rental agreement."171 
Clearly, the legislature did not desire to precisely specify the relation­
ship that would allow the landlord to terminate the lease. Instead, it chose a 
standard of reasonableness-"reasonable in light of the rent charged, the 
nature of the rental property or rental agreement."172 However, that standard 
does not give the landlord totally free reign to decide whether to make the 
repair or not. The decision must be reasonable within the parameters stated. 
Although the Act does not set out any procedure to test whether the landlord 
is making a reasonable choice, that choice is subject to inspection in any 
subsequent litigation. 
The Act appears to invoke a concept of economic impossibility or un­
reasonableness. Just because the repair might be expensive is not justifica­
tion for the landlord to terminate the lease. One factor to consider is the 
relationship of the cost of repair to the rents charged. Usually, only small 
repairs are actually paid out of current rents, larger ones are financed, either 
through purchases on credit or through loans. The Act should not be inter­
preted to mean the landlord may terminate the lease if he cannot pay for the 
repair out of current rents. If the rents are sufficient to pay the debt service 
170. As a practical matter, the judicial authority provided in the Act to terminate a lease may have the 
same practical effect as the doctrine of constructive eviction. A residential tenant, upon encountering 
premises so deficient in the normal amenities of habitable housing as to bring her to a conclusion that 
she has been constructively evicted. could still vacate the premises. If the landlord should later attempt 
to collect rent from her by legal process, she could then ask the court, as a defense to the landlord's 
action, to exercise its authority to terminate the lease, effective as of the date she vacated the premises. 
Her remedies under the Act should not depend on who initiates the action. The fact that the Act author­
izes her to initiate the action is permissive and not mandatory. 
171. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203(d)(LEXIS \999). 
172. Id. 
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on the credit purchase or loan needed to make the repair, the cost of repair is 
reasonable. 
A second factor provided for comparison is the nature of the rental 
property. The most likely meaning of this term is the value of the property. 
If the repair is extensive and the cost is excessive when compared to the low 
value of the property, the landlord might consider the repair to be "throw­
ing good money after bad."113 However, the comparison should be made not 
to the value of the property prior to the repair, but rather to the value after 
the repair is completed. If the landlord has adequate rents to pay for the 
repairs and the repairs will return the property to its prior market value, the 
landlord should be required to comply with his lease obligations. 
The final comparator is the rental agreement. It is not clear what the 
legislature might have meant by this term. One possibility might be the 
remaining length ofthe lease term. Ifonly a few weeks are remaining in the 
lease term and the landlord has intentions not to relet the premises and to 
raze the structure, it may be unreasonable to spend large amounts to repair 
the premises. In combination, this provision should not be interpreted to 
allow the landlord to ease out of his lease obligations. He has made an eco­
nomic decision that has predictable consequences. He should be allowed to 
terminate only when the obligations are unreasonably excessive and unex­
pected in relation to the rents charged, the value of the property, and the 
rental agreement. 
Assuring that the landlord has made his decision based on a reasonable 
standard is important not only to prevent the landlord from easing out the 
lease when he should be repairing the premises, but also to prevent the pro­
vision from being used as a means to disguise the landlord's retaliatory 
eviction of a tenant who complains about the condition of the premises. ,7' 
One means of assuring that such does not occur would be for the court to 
require that if the landlord chooses to terminate the lease, he must remove 
the rental unit from the rental market.17S If he has intentions to relet the 
173. Of course, it would be appropriate to ask why the landlord would have considered renting prop­
erty in such condition in the first place. 
174. Although Wyoming currently does not have any decision dealing with retaliatory eviction, the 
doctrine is an equitable one and within the discretion of the court to adopt. The Utah Supreme Court 
determined that the Utah Fit Premises Act required that it apply the doctrine of retaliatory eviction to 
prevent the landlord from evicting the tenant after the tenant had filed a complaint. Building MonitOring 
Systems, Inc. v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215, 1218-19 (Utah 1995). The Utah Act is similar to, and the basis 
of, the Wyoming Act. 
175. It must be recognized that economic conditions do change. If it should subsequently occur that 
the landlord is financially able to make the repairs he could not make earlier, he should be able to re-Iet 
the premises. However, the change of circumstances should not be a sham. [f called to task on this issue 
he should have to show that there truly was a change in his economic situation. Perhaps a rule of thumb 
might help; for example, it might be presumed that if the landlord does not keep the premises off the 
market for al [east one year, there was insufficient time for a true change in economic circumstances to 
occur. 
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rental unit, he would have to make the repairs; and if he intends to make the 
repairs, he should make the repairs for the current tenant. To place the 
premises on the rental market again would mean that the costs of the repairs 
were not unreasonable in relation to the comparator factors. 17• 
In order to implement his decision to terminate the lease, the landlord 
must notify the tenant in writing and provide the tenant with an opportunity 
to find substitute housing. 
"If the owner refuses to correct the condition and intends to termi­
nate the rental agreement, he shall notify the renter in writing within 
a reasonable time after receipt of the notice of noncompliance and 
shaH provide the renter with sufficient time to find substitute hous­
ing, which shall be no less than ten (10) days nor more than twenty 
(20) days from the date ofnotice." 
While the notice must be in writing, there is no provision about how the 
notice is to be delivered to the tenant. Unlike the requirement in Step 1, this 
notice need not be delivered by certified mail or by personal service. Ter­
mination is a significant event for both the tenant and the landlord and 
should be treated in such a way so that there is no doubt about the nature 
and clarity of the landlord's decision. In addition, the date of the notice 
begins the running of a specific period of days for the tenant to find substi­
tute housing and move out of her current premises. Thus, it would seem to 
be in the landlord's bests interest to deliver the notice by certified mail or 
personal service. 
The subsection provides that the landlord must give the tenant "suffi­
cient time to find substitute housing."177 The subsection provides a mini­
mum, as well as a maximum, period of time for the tenant to find the sub­
stitute housing. Again, it is not clear why it was necessary to specify a 
maximum period of time in the Act. As long as the tenant has an adequate 
minimum time to fmd new housing, the parties should be able to determine 
the maximum period. Perhaps there was concern that the tenant would as­
sert that an excessively long period of time was needed. The legislature 
may desire to assist the landlord in stemming such a claim by providing a 
specified period. If so, it seems to have chosen a problematically short pe­
riod. As previously stated,178 in some situations the need for a longer period 
176. It is conceivable that a landlord might argue that extensive repairs must be made and that he 
intends to re-Iet the premises at an increased rate based on those repairs. However, the increase in rent 
should not be a minimal one, for if so, then the landlord could have reasonably continued the former 
tenant under the old lease. The increase should truly be significant to allow the termination. In the end, 
the landlord should be put to the test. Ifhe re-Iets at a rate that is anything less than significantly higher, 
he is guilty ofdeceiving his former tenant and perhaps even the court. 
177. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203(d) (LEXIS 1999). 
178. See supra note 166-67 and accompanying text. 
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may be justified, especially in rural areas where nearby housing is minimal 
and often not available as rental housing.'79 
Finally, the Act provides that if the lease is terminated, "the rent paid 
shall be prorated to the date the renter vacates the unit and any balance shall 
be refunded to the renter with any deposit due in accordance with W.S. 1­
21-1208."180 The tenant is entitled to a refund of rent paid for the period of 
time that she is not able to remain in possession of the premises. However, 
the Act fails at this juncture to recognize the full extent of the tenant's posi­
tion. The landlord has not only decided to terminate the lease and thus not 
provide her with his promised consideration for the rest of the term, but he 
has also failed to provide her with his promised consideration during the 
period that the premises were defective. Since the reason the landlord is 
terminating the lease is that the premises are not habitable, the tenant has 
not been receiving the landlord's promised consideration for some time. To 
do justice to the situation and to comply with contract principles, the sub­
section should also recognize that the tenant is entitled to a refund of that 
portion of the rent that exceeds the fair rental value of the premises during 
the period of the defective condition. She has paid more consideration to 
the landlord than he provided in return. Just as the tenant is entitled to re­
cover "rent improperly retained or collected" if the landlord does not elect 
to terminate the lease, she should also be entitled to recover a similar 
amount for the period of the lease prior to his election to terminate. 
Summary of three-step remedy process. The remedy provided by the 
Act is primarily in the form of damages and is inadequate and deliberately 
attenuated. Except for the possible decree of specific performance, the ob­
jective of providing safe and sanitary housing is not facilitated. Whatever 
relief the court might ultimately decree, it is so prolonged in coming and 
difficult to achieve that one is left wondering why a tenant would bother to 
seek it, except on principle. For example, suppose that a tenant should find 
that she has no heat on January 20 th because her furnace has ceased to func­
tion. What will she have to do to obtain relief? 
First, she must give a written notice to her landlord describing the 
problem and requesting that he fix it. That notice must be delivered by cer­
tified mail or personal delivery. She must wait a reasonable period of time 
for the landlord to either fix it or terminate the lease. How long she must 
wait is not clear; nor can it be made precise. However, let us assume that it 
179. Although the subsection states that the tenant must be given at least ten days and not more than 
twenty days to find substitute housing. it does not state that the tenant must vacate the housing unit in 
that same period. However. that appears to be the probable meaning of the provision. 
180. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203(d) (LEXIS 1999). The referenced section (§ 1-21-1208) pro­
vides for the return of the deposit to the tenant and specifies the deductions that the landlord may take 
from the deposit. 
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is reasonably short"'-two days.182 On January 22nd, she then must send 
another notice to the landlord demanding that the furnace be repaired. She 
must include a list of information that the landlord already possesses, as 
well as state that if the defect is not corrected within three days she will seek 
redress in the courts. The "notice to repair or correct condition" must also 
be delivered by certified mail or personal delivery. If the furnace has not 
been repaired by January 25 th, she may commence her legal action. As­
suming that no weekend period falls on her proposed date of filing or hear­
ing, the court is sitting on the day she seeks to commence the action, and her 
summons can be delivered immediately, she can have a hearing on the issue 
no earlier than January 28th and as late as February 14th. She must cope 
with a lack of heat during a Wyoming winter for a minimum of eight days 
and perhaps as long as twenty-five days. Actually, with the likely interven­
tion of delays such as weekends and delivery delays, it is likely to be longer 
than the already extended period. 
Even if she must only wait a period of eight days, the tenant will either 
freeze to death, if she remains in the unit, or else she must move to other 
premises temporarily. During this waiting period, she is not specifically 
authorized to employ any other means of relieving her situation, such as 
hiring a heating repair service to correct the problem and withholding the 
cost thereof from her February rent. Nor is she specifically authorized to 
abate the February rent by the amount of the reduction in the fair rental 
value.1Bl Both of these remedies have become traditional for the breach of 
the implied warranty of habitability in other jurisdictions. l84 The object of 
the warranty should not only be that the landlord provide safe and sanitary 
housing, but also that the tenant have speedy and effective remedies for the 
breach of the warranty designed to reinstate the unit to a safe and sanitary 
condition. 
The tenant's relief is further impaired by the fact that her damages will 
be limited. Assuming that she or her family did not become ill because of 
the lack of heat, she will only be able to recover the rent for the eight to 
twenty-five day period, plus the costs of a motel or other alternative hous­
ing. Even if she should seek specific performance, the court order will not 
issue until the end of the eight to twenty-five day period and will probably 
take a couple of days longer to accomplish. Her termination (constructive 
181. A lack of heat is a serious defect in the middle of winter. The tenant cannot be expected to wait 
a lengthy time in that unsafe situation. 
182. Actually, a shorter period of time seems appropriate for lack of heat in the middle of winter. 
This would indicate that certified mail is not a reasonable method for delivering the notice. Assuming 
instead that the tenant leaves a copy of the notice at the landlord's abode or place of business, one might 
allow only a day for the landlord's response. However, before the tenant can respond thereafter will 
likely take the second day. 
183. In this case, the likely value would be zero since she cannot live in the unit without heat. 
184. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'! Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hilder v. St. 
Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 209-10 (Vt. 1984). See also infra notes 186-200 and accompanying text. 
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eviction) remedy, not new under this Act, might give prompt relief, but she 
has to have affordable and alternative housing available. 
In all probability, she also has no specific knowledge of the law and 
may not have realized that she should have delivered two written notices, 
one with specific detailed information, by certified mail or personal deliv­
ery. Ifeither notice procedure is deficient, she might be required to start all 
over before she can seek some relief. 18s Overall, perhaps her best chance for 
reliefmay be to wait for spring to arrive! 
Alternative remedies. Although there is no reference in the Act to any 
relief in the nature of rent abatementl86 or repair and offset, 1S7 those remedies 
are not excluded by the Act itself. Since the Act does not purport to over­
ride other possible remedies that currently exist for both the landlord and 
the tenant, or to provide the exclusive remedies for the parties, it should be 
pennissible to consider alternative modes of relief. lB. Nevertheless, steps 
one and two of the remedy process (notice provisions) might be construed 
as preconditions to the tenant obtaining alternative relief in any fashion. As 
previously noted,lSo the difficulty with those steps is not providing the land­
lord with notice, for it is reasonable that the landlord should have notice 
about the defect before the tenant seeks any relief. The difficulty is the re­
petitiveness and lengthiness of the procedure. Nevertheless, after compli­
ance with the two notice provisions, the tenant should be able to seek alter­
native relief. 
Even though not specifically provided in the Act, the tenant should be 
allowed to avail herself of the remedy of rent abatement or repair and offset. 
In addition, there exists under current Wyoming law a procedure that paral­
lels the process commonly known as rent escrow.''" 
185. This would seem unnecessary if the landlord has actually received notice of the defect. The 
court, in its broad discretionary powers, can determine that the landlord has had sufficient notice and 
must respond without further delay. 
186. Rent abatement refers to a process by which the tenant reduces the rent paid by an amount equal 
to the reduction of the fair rental value of the premises. It is part of the normal relief available for breach 
of the implied warranty of habitability. See. e.g., Hilder, 478 A.2d at 209-10. 
187. Repair and offset refers to a process by which the tenant hires someone to repair the premises 
after the landlord has failed to do so and then deducts the cost thereof from the next rent due. It is usu­
ally limited to one month's rent. It too is often allowed by the courts as a remedy for the breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability. See. e.g .. Marini Y. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (N.J. 1970). 
188. The Act itself does not provide the landlord with an eviction process nor with a damage action; 
that is left to the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-21-1001-1016 (LEXIS 
1999). Nor does the Act provide fOT termination by the tenant, except by judicial decree. The doctrine 
of constructive eviction is outside the Act. Even an action for damages that exceeds the jurisdictional 
limitations of the county or justice ofthe peace courts is not provided to either party in the Act. 
189. See supra notes 125-85 and accompanying text. 
190. Rent escrow involves the tenant depositing (escrowing) the rents with the court followed by a 
petition asking the court to determine entitlement to the rents. THE REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
PROPERTY: LANDLORD & TENANT § 11.3 (1977), refers to this remedy as "rent withholding." 
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Rent abatement is an effective remedy because it denies the landlord 
the privilege of collecting, holding and using the tenant's rent money for the 
period of time during which the premises are not in compliance with the 
implied warranty of habitability. The burden is placed on the landlord to 
bring an action to recover the rent rather than requiring the tenant to bring 
the action to recover the rent she has previously paid to the landlord. Given 
the usually inadequate relationship between the parties, it is fair not to allow 
the landlord the privilege of collecting and using the rents and to place the 
burden on him to commence litigation to recover them. 191 If the tenant can 
estimate the reduction in the rental value of the premises correctly, she can 
abate the rent by that amount. If her estimate is incorrect, courts usually 
give her a brief but reasonable time to pay the shortage. If she then fails to 
pay the shortage or, in bad faith, has grossly overestimated the reduction in 
value, the landlord may terminate the lease. 192 
Similarly, with the remedy of repair and offset, if the tenant gives the 
landlord the required notices, she is allowed to repair the defect and deduct 
that amount from the rents next due. In fact, this remedy tends to accom­
plish the purposes of the implied warranty of habitability better than dam­
ages or even rent abatement. With either of the latter two remedies, there is 
no assurance that the repairs will ever be made. They simply deny the 
landlord the right to obtain or keep the rent, to the extent that it exceeds the 
fair rental value of the premises. In contrast, the repair and offset remedy is 
designed to accomplish the actual correction of the defective condition. In 
the hypothetical described above, the tenant, after waiting the two day pe­
riod of step one and the three day period of step two, would be able to have 
the defective condition repaired immediately by a heating contractor. While 
five days might still be a long period of time during January in Wyoming, it 
is much faster than having to wait an even longer period for the right to 
collect damages or abate the rent, and still have no assurance that the condi­
tion will ever be repaired. 193 
Perhaps the strongest argument for an alternative relief may lie not in 
rent abatement or repair and offset, but in the process of rent escrow. In this 
process, the tenant deposits her rent, as it becomes due, with the clerk of 
court and, at the same time, commences an action for the court to determine 
entitlement to the rent. Strategically, this would advance the objectives of 
the implied warranty of habitability. Before the landlord could recover the 
191. See Hilder, 478 A.2d at 209-10. 

In. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1083. 

193. The repair and offset remedy is usually limited to an amount equal to approximately one month's 
rent. One reason for this is that larger repairs may need extended financing by the landlord, perhaps by 
using the real estate itself as security, and also because large repairs often involve more than the tenant's 
residential unit. Thus, the replacement of the furnace may not be an appropriate item for this remedy 
since its cost will likely exceed one month's rent. However, the installation of a new thermocouple in 
the furnace is a minor repair and would usually be covered by one month's rent. 
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rent-or at least the entire amount thereof-he would have to repair the 
defect. Until that time, the premises are not habitable and in breach of the 
warranty; as a result the landlord has not supplied his consideration and the 
tenant is entitled to a refund of some or all of the rents deposited with the 
court, the amount thereof depending on the degree to which the unit has 
been devalued. As a strategy for the tenant, it is often better than rent 
abatement or repair and offset because it shows her good faith and ability to 
pay. Since she has deposited the rent with the court, it is clear that she is 
willing and able to pay it and is not using it for other purposes. 
For two independent reasons this remedy has support in current Wyo­
ming law. The ftrst of these arises from the fact that the Residential Rental 
Property Act currently allows the court to grant "afftrmative relief as deter­
mined by the court."'" The Act further provides that affirmative relief in­
cludes "an order directing the owner to make reasonable repairs",os-an 
order of speciftc performance. In granting speciftc performance, courts take 
into consideration the means of enforcing the remedy. One means of as­
suring that the decree can be enforced is to allow the tenant to escrow her 
rent with the court. That rent may then become a source of some or all of 
the funds needed to make the repair, depending on the amount of the escrow 
to which the landlord is entitled. The court can order that fund paid to the 
landlord as and when the repair is made. 
The second reason why this relief has support in current Wyoming law 
is that a parallel process is speciftcally authorized in a different, but related, 
landlord tenant situation. Currently, a tenant who is taking an appeal from a 
Forcible Entry and Detainer judgment must deposit the amount of rent 
specifted in the lower court's decree with the court. She must also deposit 
future rents with the court as they become due. The rents are retained by 
the clerk of court pending the determination of the appeal.'" Although this 
statutory provision does not speciftcally authorize tenants to deposit rents 
with the court incident to an action to determine entitlement to them, the 
court has sufficiently broad equitable powers to authorize a similar process. 
Probably the most signiftcant argument that the landlord may make 
against the escrow process is that tenant's failure to pay the rent directly to 
the landlord violates the lease or even a speciftc provision of the Residential 
Rental Property Act. l97 However, escrowing such funds with the court must 
be an exception to those requirements. Otherwise, depositing the rents on 
appeal of a Forcible Entry and Detainer action would also be a violation of 
194. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1206(c)(LEXIS 1999). 
195. [d. 
196. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1015 (LEXIS 1999). 
197. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1204(a)(vi) (LEXIS 1999) provides that the tenant shall "[b]e current 
on all payments required by the rental agreement." 
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the lease and, of necessity, the appealing tenant could be evicted. Such a 
result is obviously not intended under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act. 
In effect, the depositing of the rents with the court is the payment of the rent 
to the clerk of court as an escrow agent for the landlord. If the landlord is 
entitled to them after the appeal is concluded, he will get actual possession 
of the rents. Until that time, he has constructive possession by the fact that 
they are in the possession of the escrow agent. 
Similarly, with regard to escrowing rents to enforce the implied war­
ranty of habitability, a tenant is invoking a legitimate legal process. The 
rents can be viewed as deposited with the clerk of court as an escrow agent 
for the landlord. The payment to the clerk satisfies the requirement that the 
tenant "be current on all payments required by the rental agreement."I •• If 
the court subsequently determines that the landlord is entitled to the rents, 
they will be transferred to his actual possession. If, on the other hand, the 
landlord is not entitled to some or all of the rents, that amount will not be 
transferred to the landlord, but instead will be returned to the tenant. 
This procedure is not a novel one. It has been used in other jurisdic­
tions and approved by their courts. I" It is also recognized by the Restate­
ment (Second) of Property and, in fact, is viewed by the drafters of that 
document as the preferred means of rent abatement and the ultimate relief 
for the tenant.lOO 
E. Tenant's Duties 
The relationship between the landlord and the tenant is a reciprocal 
one. Among the landlord's duties are the obligations to comply with all 
expressed covenants, not to interfere in a substantial way with the tenant's 
quiet enjoyment of the premises, and to provide the tenant with premises 
that are safe, sanitary, and fit for human habitation. In a reciprocal fashion, 
the Act sets forth certain duties the tenant owes to the landlord. These du­
ties are both affirmative and prohibitive. 
The list of tenant's duties starts with four interrelated ones: The tenant 
must maintain the leased premises "in a clean and safe condition and not 
unreasonably burden any common area."lOI This duty is related to the ear­
lier-stated duty of the landlord-to provide premises that are safe and sani­
tary. Their similarity does not mean that the provisions are in conflict, 
198. Jd. 
199. See. e.g.• Marini v.lreland,265 A.2d 526, 535 (N.J. 1970). 
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD & TENANT § 11.3 (1917). 
201. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1·21-1204(a)(i) (LEXIS 1999). This duty extends beyond the residential 
unit itself to the common areas. That provision probably was unnecessary since WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1­
21-1201(a)(iv) (LEXIS 1999) defines the residential rental unit as including common areas, appurte­
nances, grounds, and facilities. 
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however. The tenant's duty stated here as an affirmative duty is really an 
obligation not to engage in conduct that would render the premises unclean 
and unsafe and thus defeat the landlord's efforts to provide safe and sanitary 
prermses. 
The three duties listed immediately thereafter are more akin to exam­
ples of this first duty than to separate and distinct obligations. One of them 
requires the tenant to dispose of garbage in a clean and safe manner, and 
two of them prohibit the tenant from engaging in conduct that would impair 
the landlord's efforts to provide operational electrical, heating and plumbing 
systems, and hot and cold running water. The tenant must: 
(ii) Dispose of all garbage and other waste in a clean and safe 
manner; 
(iii) Maintain all plumbing fixtures in a condition as sanitary as 
the fixtures permit; 
(iv) Use all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating and other fa­
cilities and appliances in a reasonable manner; ...'02 
Some examples of these duties might include the following: The first 
duty might require the tenant to collect her own garbage and other waste 
and dispose of it in the proper receptacles provided by the landlord, whether 
garbage disposals, incinerators, refuse cans, dumpsters, or other receptacles. 
In the alternative, the tenant will have to dispose of the garbage off prem­
ises.'·3 Allowing the waste to accumulate around the housing unit would be 
a violation of this duty. Similarly, improperly disposing of waste in other 
than the proper receptacles, whether in common areas or elsewhere on the 
premises, would be a violation. 
The second duty might require the tenant to keep the kitchen and toilet 
plumbing facilities in as sanitary condition as they permit. Failure to clean 
them in a reasonable fashion would be a violation. The third duty has many 
examples. Forcing items into the kitchen or toilet plumbing facilities that 
should not be placed there might be a violation. Overloading electrical cir­
cuits in such a fashion as would cause danger of short circuit, electrical dis­
charge, or overload might be a violation. Improper use of a landlord­
supplied stove, oven, or refrigerator might also be a violation. As can be 
seen, none of the duties reduces the landlord's initial obligation to supply 
premises that are safe and sanitary. The tenant simply may not engage in 
202. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1204(a)(ii)-(iv) (LEXIS 1999). 
203. In this regard, the Utah Fit Premises Act § 57-224(1)(e) (1999) provides that ''for buildings 
containing more than two residential rental units, [the landlord must] provide and maintain appropriate 
receptacles for garbage and other waste and arrange for its removal, except to the extent that renters and 
owners otherwise agree." That provision was deleted from the Wyoming Residential Rental Property 
Act. In this regard, there is no reciprocal duty on the part of the landlord to provide the facilities in 
which to place the garbage and waste. 
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activities that cancel out the landlord's efforts to supply safe and sanitary 
facilities. 
The list of duties continues: The tenant must "[o]ccupy the rental unit 
in the manner for which it was designed and shall not increase the number 
of occupants above that specified in the rental agreement without written 
permission of the owner ... .''204 Occupancy in the manner for which the 
unit was designed is not easily defined. Obviously, a residential unit is de­
signed for residential use. The unit may not be used for commercial or in­
dustrial purposes, as those terms are commonly understood. However, de­
pending on the wording of the lease, and applicable land use regulations and 
restrictive covenants, the tenant may be able to conduct some low intensity 
business enterprise in the unit as long as it is compatible with the residential 
use. 
The primary issue of occupancy is addressed in the remainder of the 
sentence-occupancy by a greater number of people than specified in the 
lease. If this provision is to be enforced, there must be an agreement about 
the number of occupants in the lease, and the Act so provides. However, 
oftentimes the number of occupants is not stated in the lease or there may be 
some lack of clarity in the provision. That does not mean that the tenant can 
bring in as many occupants as she wishes; it simply means that the number 
of occupants is not specific and easily determined. 
Other common issues regarding the number of occupants involve in­
creases due to the birth or adoption of children, or sometimes merely the 
existence of children. While the landlord has the general authority to limit 
the number of occupants in the rental unit, any discrimination based on 
family status is prohibited under the Federal Fair Housing Act.'05 Similarly, 
a failure to provide reasonable accommodations for handicapped persons is 
a violation of both the Federal Fair Housing Act'06 and Wyoming statute.'·' 
The Act then obligates the tenant to be "current on all payments re­
quired by the rental agreement."'·· This is undoubtedly a repeat of one or 
more covenants contained in the lease itself. The most obvious payment 
required of the tenant in the lease is the rent payment. The lease may spec­
ify other payments that must be made to the landlord. For example, the 
lease may require the tenant to pay a portion of the utility bills paid by the 
landlord, based on some formula or meter readings. 
204. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1204(aXv) (LEXIS 1999). 
205. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-{e) (1999). As to occupancy limits and the possible issues that may result 
therefrom see generally Pfaff v. H.U.D., 88 F.3d 739, 745-49 (9th Cir. 1996); Mountain Side Mobile 
Estates Partnership v. H.U.D., 56 F.3d 1243, 1248-57 (10th Cir. 1995); Glover v. Crestwood Lake Sec­
tion I Holding Corps., 746 F. Supp. 301, 304-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
206. 42 U.S.c. § 3604(f) (1999). 
207. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-13-201 to-204 (LEXIS 1999). 
208. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1204(a)(vi) (LEXIS 1999). 
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It is not clear whether the provision was intended to apply to other 
payments specified in the lease, which are to be made to third parties. The 
wording of the provision applies to "all payments required" by the lease. 
The lease may provide that the "tenant shall pay for her own telephone 
services." It may be argued that a failure to pay those items would be a 
violation of the Act. However, that seems to be an unwarranted interpreta­
tion. The landlord is not directly benefited by the payment-for example, 
by avoiding a lien if the telephone bill is not paid. The probable reason why 
such a provision was inserted in the lease is not to require the tenant to pay 
her telephone bills on time-that will certainly be required in her agreement 
with the telephone company-but rather to inform her that the landlord will 
not supply telephone service as part of the amenities under the lease and that 
she must do so. Telephone service is a minor example of several other such 
provisions that may be contained in a lease. Whether a failure to pay these 
items is encompassed by the duty created by the Act could be important 
since the tenant is denied the right to serve a complaint to the landlord about 
a breach of the implied warranty of habitability if she is not "current on all 
payments required by the rental agreement"209 and may not file the "notice to 
repair or correct condition" if she is not "in compliance with all provisions 
ofW.S. 1-21-1204...."210 Whether the tenant's bill to the telephone com­
pany is paid is irrelevant to the question of whether the tenant should be 
able to enforce the implied warranty, and the Act should not be interpreted 
to require such payments in order to seek relief. 
The next provision obligates the tenant to perform all the obligations 
specified in the lease, and it presumably applies to obligations other than the 
duty to make the payments specified in the prior provision. The tenant shall 
"[c]omply with all lawful requirements of the rental agreement between the 
owner and the renter ...."211 Again, this adds nothing to the tenant's actual 
obligations since, as a matter of contract law, she would be required to per­
form all the covenants she has made in the lease. However, if the tenant is 
not in compliance with this duty she is denied the right to serve a "notice to 
repair or correct condition" on her landlord.212 Certainly, a tenant should 
perform all the lawful duties she has undertaken in the lease. However, it is 
not clear why the performance of some of those duties should have an effect 
on her ability to obtain relief under the Act if they have no relevancy to the 
enforcement of the implied warranty of habitability. Perhaps the courts 
might interpret this requirement to mean that the tenant must perform only 
those duties that are relevant to the implied warranty in order to seek relief 
under the Act. 
209. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203(b)(LEXIS 1999). 
210. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1206(a)(LEXIS 1999). 
211. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1204(a)(vii) (LEXIS 1999). 
212. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1206(a)(LEXIS 1999). 
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The final affirmative duty placed on the tenant is that she must clean the 
unit when she terminates the lease. The tenant shall "[r]emove all property 
and garbage either owned or placed within the residential rental unit by the 
renter or his guests prior to the termination of the rental agreement and 
clean the rental unit to the condition at the beginning of the rental agree­
ment."213 This provision has a couple ramifications for the tenant at the time 
she is leaving the premises. First of all, it sets the foundation upon which 
the landlord will be able to remove and dispose of the tenant's personal 
property left in the unit after termination.214 Second, it requires the tenant to 
clean the unit prior to leaving. If she fails to do so, the Act allows the 
landlord to clean the unit and charge the cost of the cleaning against the 
tenant's deposit.21S 
It should be noted that although leases usually contain a covenant re­
quiring the tenant to clean the premises before leaving, this provision states 
that it is a duty of the tenant to do so even if the lease should not contain 
such a covenant. The extent of the cleaning required by the Act opens an­
other important issue for many tenants. The provision states that the tenant 
must return the ''unit to the condition at the beginning of the rental agree­
ment."216 The condition of the premises will naturally deteriorate over a 
period of time, especially if the lease is renewed several times. For exam­
ple, during such a period, the walls may receive the usual marks and the 
floor may get the usual dirt. Unlike another provision dealing with 
repairs,217 this section is not limited to cleaning the premises to its condition 
at the beginning of the lease, reasonable wear and tear excepted. The provi­
sion also is unclear about an issue that regularly arises between the landlord 
and tenant at the termination of the lease. Is it sufficient for the tenant to 
clean the unit herself or is it necessary that she employ a commercial 
cleaner, such as for steam cleaning a rug? Landlords often require commer­
cial cleaning of the rug, for example, but the reason why that should be re­
quired is not clear if the premises are in "the condition [they were in] at the 
beginning of the rental agreement."218 
The Act sets forth three duties of the tenant in the form of prohibited 
acts. The first prohibition requires that the tenant not "[i]ntentionally or 
negligently destroy, deface, damage, impair or remove any part of the resi­
dential unit or lmowingly permit any person to do SO."219 This is an under­
213. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1204(a)(viii) (LEXIS 1999). 
214. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1210 (LEXIS 1999). For further discussion, see infra notes 265-85 
and accompanying text. 
215. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(a) (LEXIS 1999). For further discussion, see infra notes 239-64 
and accompanying text. 
216. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1204(a)(viii) (LEXIS 1999). 
217. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(a) (LEXIS 1999). 
218. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1204(a)(viii) (LEXIS 1999). 
219. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-120S(a)(i) (LEXIS 1999). 
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standable and reasonable obligation of the tenant. However, because of its 
interrelation with two other provisions of the Act, there may be some issue. 
Does the prohibition apply to damage that can be characterized as rea­
sonable wear and tear?220 The answer to this question might be implied 
elsewhere in the Act. In dealing with allowable deductions from the ten­
ant's deposit, the landlord is allowed to deduct for "damages to the residen­
tial rental unit beyond reasonable wear and tear ...."221 It seems unlikely 
that the legislature intended to impose an obligation on the tenant for which 
it does not allow the landlord to collect. This is buttressed by the fact that 
the language of this section speaks in terms that import infliction of gross 
hann to the unit rather than the gradual accumulation ofminor scratches and 
nicks that are the common nature of ordinary wear and tear.222 
The interpretation of this section is important to the tenant since she 
may not serve a "notice to repair or correct condition" unless she IS "in 
compliance with all provisions of W.S.... 1-21-1205...."223 If a minor, 
negligently-created "scratch" on a countertop will prevent her from seeking 
redress for a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, she may be de­
nied that right. Relevancy seems to be the important issue here. If the dam­
age is not relevant to the breach of the warranty, there is no reason to inter­
pret the provision as preventing a tenant from seeking a redress. In some 
situations, the infliction of ordinary wear and tear will not be relevant to the 
breach being asserted. In others, the ordinary wear and tear may have ac­
cumulated and be the cause of the premises being unsafe or unsanitary. 
The next prohibition states that the tenant may not "[i]nterfere with an­
other person's peaceful enjoyment of the residential property."224 The object 
of this provision is twofold. First, it places a duty on the tenant not to inter­
fere with another person in the use and enjoyment of the other person's 
leased unit. If she does so, the landlord has the authority to enforce this 
provision against her. If need be, the landlord may terminate the lease and 
remove her from the premises.225 
Second, this provision may give another tenant grounds to assert that 
the landlord has breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment by not enforcing 
the prohibition. The covenant of quiet enjoyment provides that neither the 
220. See, e.g., Scott v. Prazma, 555 P.2d 571 (Wyo. 1976). "An ordinary covenant to keep the prem­
ises in good repair does not include the restoration of a part ofa building which has become so run-down 
that it cannot be repaired. . .. [OJrdinary wear and tear include any usual deterioration from the use of 
the premises and by the lapse of time." [d. at 579. 
221. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(a)(LEXIS 1999). 
222. [DJestroy, deface, damage, impair or remove any part of the residential renlal unit. ..." WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1205(a)(i)(LEXIS 1999). 
223. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1206(a) (LEXIS 1999). 
224. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1205(a)(2)(LEXIS 1999). 
225. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-IOO2(a)(vi)(LEXIS 1999). 
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landlord nor anyone with superior title will interfere, in a substantial way, 
with the quiet use and enjoyment of the tenant's premises. Since the noise 
or other interference caused by one tenant in the building is not the direct 
action of the landlord nor of anyone with superior title, the traditional re­
sponse to this problem has been that there is no breach of the covenant of 
quiet enjoyment.226 However, courts have held, especially in recent years, 
that if the landlord has the authority to prevent the offending tenant from 
continuing the interference and fails to exercise that authority, it is ulti­
mately the landlord's inaction that causes the breach of the covenant. As a 
result, the offended tenant may assert constructive eviction or seek damages 
from the landlord for breach of the covenant.22' 
The final prohibition in this section deals with access to the unit for re­
pair, inspection or showing of the unit for sale or rent. The tenant may not 
"[u ]nreasonably deny access to, refuse entry to or withhold consent to enter 
the residential rental unit to the owner, agent or manager for the purpose of 
making repairs to or inspecting the unit, and showing the unit for rent or 
sale."228 Similar provisions are usually made in the lease itself. The prohi­
bition in the Act is conditioned on the landlord's request for access being 
reasonable. Reasonableness is a flexible term and will vary with the reason 
for the access and the circumstances involved. The usual issues are notice 
and time of access. If the reason for the access is to correct a broken water 
pipe that is flooding a downstairs apartment, the access should be immedi­
ate and without any need for prior notice. Even in that case, however, the 
landlord must be sensitive to the tenant's personal situation and allow the 
tenant a "moment" to adjust. By comparison, if the access is to show the 
apartment for sale or rent, the landlord should give advance notice inform­
ing the tenant of the time and date of the visit. The notice usually need not 
be far in advance but it must be reasonable under the circumstances. Fi­
nally, except for extreme emergencies, such as the broken water pipe, the 
access should be during the normal daytime hours and not during the even­
ing or nighttime hours. 
F. Landlord's Remedies 
Eviction. The Residential Rental Property Act itself does not provide 
two of the more important landlord remedies-an action to terminate the 
lease and an action to recover damages for failure to pay the rent. They are 
provided, however, in the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute.229 Two sepa­
226. See, e.g., Thompson v. Harris, 452 P.2d 122, 126 (Ariz. App. 1969); Katz v. Duffy, 158 N.E. 264 
(Mass. 1927); Sciascia v. Riverpark Apts., 444 N .E.2d 40, 42 (Ohio App. 1981). 
227. See, e.g., Eskanos & Supperstein v. Irwin, 637 P.2d 403, 405 (Colo. App. 1981); Bocchini v. 
Gom Management Co.• 515 A.2d 1179, 1185-86 (Md. App. 1986); Gottdeiner v. Mailhot, 431 A.2d 851. 
854-55 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1981). 
228. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1205(a)(iii) (LIDOS 1999). 
229. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-21-1001 through 1016 (LEX IS 1999). 
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rate provisions of that statute provide for the eviction of a tenant. Forcible 
entry and detainer proceedings are available: 
(i) 	 Against tenants holding over their terms or after a failure to 
pay rent for three (3) days after it is due; ... 
(vi) 	 Against renters in violation of any terms imposed under 
W.S. 1-21-1204 or 1-21-1205.130 
The first subsection allows the landlord to evict the tenant if she has 
failed to pay her rent for a period of three days after it is due. Similarly, 
under the second subsection, the failure to pay rent is also grounds for evic­
tion since section 1204 of the Act provides that the tenant must be current 
on all payments required by the lease. There is a small difference between 
the two provisions, however. Section 1204 does not state that the tenant has 
a three day grace period after the rent is due, as does the first provision. It is 
not clear whether the legislature intended that difference and, if so, how that 
difference should be resolved.231 
If a court enters a decree under the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute 
authorizing the eviction of a tenant, the Residential Rental Property Act also 
authorizes the sheriff to "remove the renter's possessions and prevent the 
renter from reentering the premises without further action by the COurt.''Zl2 
Thus, the sheriff may move promptly to evict the tenant and her personal 
property. He may also take such action as is necessary to prevent the tenant 
from reentering.2l) The landlord does not need to obtain additional authority 
from the court for such action. 
Damages. The Forcible Entry and Detainer statute allows the landlord 
to obtain a judgment against the tenant for any rent unpaid at the time the 
action is filed.23< The landlord may seek enforcement of that judgment by 
requesting the sheriff to levy and execute upon the property of the tenanU" 
230. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-IOO2(a)(i), (vi) (LEX IS 1999). 
231. One interpretation that would reconcile the two provisions would be to allow a landlord to com­
mence the action to evict residential tenants immediately upon failure to pay rent while requiring that he 
give all other tenants three days of grace. However, such an interpretation has neither logic nor policy to 
support it Why should a commercial tenant have a three day grace period while a residential tenant does 
not? 
232. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-121 I (a)(LEXIS 1999). 
233. Such action might include allowing the landlord to change the locks under the supervision of the 
sheriff. 
234. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-IOO8(b) (LEXIS 1999). "If the case is one based on failure to pay 
rent, the justice shall further find the amount of rent due and payable at the time of commencement of 
the action ...." [d. If the landlord should seek to recover rent for any term beyond the date when the 
action was commenced, or if the amount of the rent exceeds the jurisdictional amount of the justice of 
the peace or county court, the landlord will have to bring a separate action for damages in the district 
court. See Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 950-51 (Wyo. 1963). 
235. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1013 (LEXIS 1999). 
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In addition, the landlord may deduct any "accrued rent" from the tenant's 
deposit."O 
If the tenant should cause any damage to the residential unit beyond 
reasonable wear and tear, or if she should fail to clean the unit to its condi­
tion at the commencement of the lease, the landlord may also deduct the 
costs of repairing or cleaning from the deposit.2l7 Should the deposit be in­
sufficient to compensate the landlord for such costs, the landlord may re­
cover that amount, plus ten percent annual interest, by bringing an action for 
damages.238 
Collection and application ofdeposits. The Act allows the landlord to 
collect a deposit from the tenant, which may be applied "to the payment of 
accrued rent, damages to the residential unit beyond reasonable wear and 
tear, the cost to clean the unit to the condition at the beginning of the rental 
agreement and to other costs provided by any contract."2'. The deposit may 
also be used to secure the payment of utility charges. However, any part of 
the deposit that is held to secure the payment of utility charges must be 
separately identified as such. 240 
The rental agreement must state, "whether any portion of a deposit is 
nonrefundable and written notice of this fact" must be given to the tenant at 
the time the deposit is collected from the tenant!'· The Act is not clear 
whether the lease provision and notice must be given only if the deposit is 
absolutely nonrefundable or also if it is conditionally nonrefundable. An 
absolutely nonrefundable deposit would occur if the tenant makes a deposit, 
some or all ofwhich is not to be refunded in any circumstance and which is, 
as a practical matter, prepaid rent. A conditionally nonrefundable deposit 
would occur in the lease provided that the tenant would forfeit the deposit 
upon an early termination of the lease.242 
Since prepaid rent and security deposits are often collected by the 
landlord at the same time, a tenant might be confused about what portion of 
the payment is refundable. It seems clear that the landlord must, under a 
minimal interpretation of this provision, notify the tenant that the prepaid 
rent will not be refunded. Whether the landlord must notify the tenant that 
236. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(a) (LEXIS 1999). The Act provides that U[u]pon tennination of 
the rental agreement, ... money held as a deposit may be applied ... to the payment of accrued rent. .. 
. " ld. This provision is limited to accrued rent. It does not allow the landlord to deduct for rent accruing 
in the future. 
237. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-21-1208(a),1211(a) (LEXIS 1999). 
238. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1211(a)(LEXIS 1999). 
239. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(a)(LEXIS 1999). 
240. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(b) (LEXIS 1999). 
241. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1207 (LEXIS 1999). 
242. Cf Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918 (Utah 1997), where the court held that 
a "termination fee" of one and a half months' rent was an unenforceable penalty. ld. at 922-24. 
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some of the deposit may not be refunded due to early termination of the 
lease is not clear. Nevertheless, it might be wise if the landlord did provide 
in the lease, or separately in a notice to the tenant, the conditions under 
which the rent will not be refunded.l" The lease and the written notice 
might simply state the conditions as listed in the Act. 
After the end of the lease term, the landlord must return the deposit, or 
any balance remaining after permitted deductions, to the tenant. In order to 
do so, he will need to know the tenant's new mailing address.l'" It would be 
wise for both the landlord and the tenant if the tenant were to supply her 
new mailing address to the landlord before she vacates the rental unit. In 
some situations it might even be possible for the landlord to obtain that in­
formation at the beginning of the lease term.245 In an attempt to assure that 
the tenant gives her new mailing address information to the landlord, the 
Act places the burden on the tenant. It provides that "[t]he renter shall 
within thirty (30) days of termination of the rental agreement, notify the 
owner or designated agent of the location where the payment and notice 
may be made or mailed."l46 However, the Act does not specify the conse­
quences of any failure on the part of the tenant to notify the landlord of the 
new mailing address. Does it mean that the deposit, or any balance thereof, 
is forfeited?2'? Where should the landlord keep the deposit until the tenant 
notifies him of a mailing address? Does the unclaimed property act apply 
and require the landlord to pay it to the state depository?2" 
Unlike security deposit legislation in some states, the tenant is not enti­
tled to interest on the deposit.l" At the end of the lease, the landlord need 
only return the deposit, or any balance due thereof, without interesUSO The 
Act appears to treat the relationship between the landlord and tenant as one 
of debtor and creditor and not as one involving a trust or other fiduciary 
relationship. The consequences of that relationship could reach far beyond 
the tenant not being entitled to interest on the deposit. For example, since 
243. Both as a precaution under the Act and to establish better landlord tenant relations. 
244. As will be discussed below, the landlord will also need to know the tenant's new mailing address 
for purposes of dealing with any personal property left in the unit by the tenant. See infra note 278 and 
accompanying text. 
245. For example, in academic year leases to students at a university or community college, the mail­
ing address at the end of the academic year might be the home address of the tenant's parents. However, 
there is no universality to this observation since many students do not return to live with their parents 
during the summer. Furthermore, the home address of the tenant's parents may change after the begin­
ning of the lease term but prior to its ending. 
246. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21·1208(a) (LEXIS 1999). 
247. That does not seem to be the intent. The landlord must return the deposit to the tenant within the 
thirty days after termination of the lease, or within fifteen days after the tenant supplies the mailing 
address, whichever is later. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(a) (LEXIS 1999). Since the landlord must 
return the deposit within fifteen days after the tenant supplies the mailing address, even if it is more than 
thirty days after the termination of the lease, the landlord must not be able to declare a forfeiture . 
. 248. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-24·101 through 140 (LEX IS 1999). 
249. See, e.g., N.Y. Rent & Eviction Regs. § 2105.5 (McKinney 1999). 
250. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(a) (LEXIS 1999). 
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there is no fiduciary relationship, the landlord may keep any interest on the 
deposit even if he places it in an interest bearing account in a bank or sav­
ings institution. Further, the landlord may commingle the deposit with his 
other assets or accounts. As a consequence, if the landlord should become 
bankrupt before the end of the lease term, the tenant may only be entitled to 
a creditor's share of assets in bankruptcy and would not have a claim 
against a separate fund held by a trustee.251 
The Act provides that the balance of the deposit and a written itemiza­
tion of any deductions therefrom must be delivered or mailed to the tenant 
within thirty days after the termination of the lease, or within fifteen days 
after the landlord receives the tenant's mailing address, whichever is later.2S2 
However, should there be damage to the residential unit the landlord might 
need more time to perfonn the repair and to determine the amount of dam­
age to charge the tenant. As a result, the Act provides that when damages 
occur to the unit the landlord has an additional thirty days, i.e. a total of 
sixty days, after the termination of the lease to refund, and itemize the de­
ductions from the deposit.25J 
If any portion of the deposit is held as a security deposit for the payment 
of utility charges, the landlord must refund the deposit within ten days after 
he receives "a satisfactory showing" that all utility charges incurred by the 
tenant have been paid. Probably the usual way for a tenant to make such a 
showing would be to provide the landlord with a final bill from the utility 
company showing that all utility charges are paid. If the utility company 
will not send the bill, or a copy, directly to the landlord, the tenant will have 
to submit her copy to the landlord. 
If the utility charges have not been paid within forty-five days after the 
termination of the lease, the owner "shall"'" apply the deposit to pay the 
utility charges within the next fifteen days. If any refund is due to the ten­
ant after the payment of the utility charges, the landlord must refund that 
amount to the tenant within seven days after the deposit is applied to pay the 
charges.2S5 
15th251. See generally COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 541.11 (Lawrence P. King, Ed. ed. 1999). 
"[W)here the recipient of the funds can by agreement use them as the recipient's own and commingle 
them with the recipient's monies, a debtor-creditor relationship exists, not a trust." /d. at 541-59. 
252. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(a) (LEXIS 1999). 
253. [d. This provision does not specifically provide that the landlord has until fifteen days after the 
tenant supplies the mailing address, if that is later. However, it would seem to apply since the landlord 
might not have the tenant's mailing address within the sixty day period. 
254. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(b) (LEXIS 1999). The Act provides, in mandatory terms, that 
the landlord shall apply the utility deposit to the payment of the utility charges. 
255. /d. The Act states that the landlord has until fifteen days after the receipt of the tenant's new 
mailing address if that is later. 
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The combination of the various periods of time to refund and account 
for the deposits can be very confusing and cumbersome to both parties, es­
pecially to the landlord. He must refund the deposit within thirty days, un­
less there are damages to the unit or unless some of the deposit is for utility 
charges; he must refund and account for utility charge deductions within 
seven days after the expiration of sixty days;256 and he must refund and ac­
count for damage deductions within sixty days. These periods may also be 
extended because the landlord has not received the tenant's new mailing 
address. Certainly, each of the periods has an individual justification, but in 
combination, they result in a very complex matrix, which may help to create 
unnecessary disputes between the now ex-tenant and ex-landlord. 
The Act provides a remedy to the tenant if the landlord "unreasonably 
fails to comply" with the provisions regarding refund of the deposit.2S7 
Since the Act provides relief only if the landlord's failure is unreasonable, 
the circumstances causing the delay must be given some consideration 
should the landlord fail to meet the specific timelines established in the 
prior two subsections of the Act. An example of a "reasonable failure" 
might include a circumstance in which a landlord was late in providing the 
accounting and/or refund, by a short period, and that lateness was itself 
caused by an extended time2S8 needed to repair damage to the unit caused by 
the tenant. Nevertheless, if the landlord is unreasonable in his failure to 
comply, the tenant may recover the full deposit and court costs. 
The real teeth of this provision is the loss of the deposit by the landlord, 
despite the fact that there may be unpaid rent or utility charges or uncom­
pensated damage to the premises. Although the subsection is silent about 
whether the landlord could turn around and bring a separate action to re­
cover those amounts, if he were able to do so, the "incentive" provided by 
this subsection might be particularly toothless. If the tenant should bring an 
action under this provision and the landlord could counterclaim and recover 
for damages, resulting in an offset against the refund, where is the "incen­
tive?" 
The subsection does not allow the tenant to recover attorneys' fees. 259 
The tenant's recovery is limited to "the full deposit and court costS."260 If 
the tenant should bring an action to recover the deposit and the landlord 
256. This sixty day period is the sum of the forty-five days the landlord must wait for the tenant to 
provide a showing that she has paid the utility charges and the fifteen days within which he must apply 
the deposit to pay the charges. 
257. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(c)(LEXIS 1999). 
258. Beyond the extra thirty days provided in the Act. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(a) (LEXIS 
1999). 
259. However, since the amount of recovery would normally fit within the jurisdictional amount of a 
small claims action, one might expect some tenants to seek recovery without an attorney. WYo. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 1-21-201 to 205 (LEXIS 1999). 
260. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1208(c) (LEXIS 1999). 
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should prevail, the landlord may recover "court costs in addition to any 
other relief available"'·' if the tenant "acted unreasonably in bringing the 
acti on. "262 
The Act also provides that the "holder of the interest of the owner or 
designated agent in the residential unit at the time of the termination of the 
rental agreement shall be bound by the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Sections 1­
21-1207 and 1-21-1208."263 The result of this provision is that the person 
who is the owner or the managing agent at the time of the termination of the 
lease is bound by the deposit and refund provisions of the Act, even if he 
was not the owner or managing agent who collected the deposit at the time 
of the execution ofthe lease. Thus, the owner or managing agent at the time 
of the termination of the lease may not defend against the tenant's demand 
for a refund of the deposit by asserting that she should obtain a refund from 
the former owner or managing agent. 
Despite the fact that the new owner or managing agent may be liable for 
the refund of the deposit, the provision does not absolve the former landlord 
or managing agent from liability. Thus, each has an interest in assuring that 
the deposit monies are available for refund to the tenant when the lease ter­
minates. A wise seller and purchaser of rented property may arrange for an 
escrow of the deposits at the time of the sale. The escrow might provide 
that each tenant's deposit will be released from the escrow account only 
after the termination of the tenant's lease,''' either to the tenant in satisfac­
tion of the landlord's refund obligations or to the new landlord in payment 
for unpaid rent, utility charges, or for damage to the residential unit. 
Personal property left in the unit. A perennial issue for landlords is the 
personal property left in the premises after the tenant vacates the residential 
unit. It is really a two part issue-whether the landlord can dispose of the 
property without potential for liability to the tenant or anyone else for con­
version, and whether the landlord can apply the property to the payment of 
rent, damages or other obligations that the tenant owes to the landlord. The 
Act provides the landlord with a process for resolving the issue of conver­
sion. To a limited degree, it also provides some answer to the issue of ap­




263. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1209 (LEXIS 1999). 
264. Particular attention and clarity may be needed to deal with the termination of periodic tenancies 
or lease renewals. 
265. The Act does not deal with the issue of landlord's liens. This issue was recently presented in 
Sheridan Commercial Park. Inc. v. Briggs, 848 P.2d 811 (Wyo. 1993). The tenant left various tools and 
equipment in the leased premises when he vacated the real estate. The tools were leased either to the 
tenant or subject to an Article 9 security interest. The real estate landlord asserted that it had a landlord's 
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The Act provides that after the owner regains possession of the leased 
premises, he "may immediately dispose of any trash or property the owner 
reasonably believes to be hazardous, perishable or valueless and aban­
doned."'66 This subsection allows the landlord to dispose of personal prop­
erty fitting the specified categories without fear of a claim by the tenant or 
another person that the landlord has committed a conversion in so doing. 
The legislature apparently thought that the question of whether the per­
sonal property is hazardous or perishable is a factual one and that it should 
be detennined by the landlord based on the nature of the personal property. 
It did not make any further attempt at defming hazardous or perishable 
goods. However, it did attempt to give the landlord some assistance in re­
solving the question of whether personal property is valueless and aban­
doned. It did so by setting up a process of notice and demand. 
First, the Act establishes a presumption that all property left in the unit 
is valueless and abandoned: "Any property remaining within the rental unit 
after tennination of the rental agreement shall be presumed to be both val­
ueless and abandoned."'67 However, the Act then contains a confusing 
statement: "Any valuable property may be removed from the residential 
rental unit" and must be disposed of in a specified manner.'68 The statement 
is confusing because if "any property remaining in the rental unit"'·' is pre­
sumed to be valueless, what property is left to be valuable? Perhaps all that 
the first sentence was meant to accomplish was to establish a prima facie 
presumption that property left on the premises is valueless. The landlord 
may then dispose of such property if he is confident that it is actually val­
ueless and abandoned. If he is not certain that it is valueless (or aban­
doned), he can convert the prima facie presumption into a conclusive pre­
sumption ifhe follows the notice and demand procedure.270 
The notice and demand procedure then continues as follows: The 
owner must give written notice to the tenant. That notice must describe the 
property claimed to be abandoned and state that it will be disposed of if the 
tenant does not, within seven days after service of the notice, either take 
possession ofthe property or notify the landlord of her intent to take posses-
lien on the tools left to secure the unpaid rent. It based its claim on a statute allowing a lien for work or 
services performed on goods or chattels. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 29-7-IOI(a) (Mitchie 1993). The Wyo­
ming Supreme Court held that the statute made no reference to a lien for rent and, therefore, did not 
create a landlord's lien to secure the rent owed to the landlord. 848 P.2d at 816-17. The personal prop­
erty lessee and lender with a perfected security interest prevailed. See also Slane v. Polar Oil Co., 41 
P.2d 490 (Wyo. 1935), dealing with the ancient doctrine of distraint. 




270. It should be noted that this process applies to "any property remaining in the rental unit." Thus, 
it purports to apply to property whether it belongs to the tenant or it belongs to a third party guest or 
invitee. 
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sion.271 The notice may be served on the tenant in one of three ways: (i) by 
certified mail, in which case it is deemed served on the date it is mailed;272 
(ii) by personal service in accordance with Rule 4 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure, in which case it is deemed served on the date of the serv­
ice;273 or (iii) by publication in a newspaper published in the county where 
the rental unit is located or widely circulated in that county, in which case it 
is deemed served on the date of publication.274 If the landlord does not re­
ceive a written response from the tenant within seven days after service, 
''the property shall be conclusively deemed abandoned and the owner may 
retain or dispose of the property."27S If the tenant responds in writing within 
the seven day period after service indicating that she intends to take posses­
sion of the personal property, the landlord must hold the property for an 
additional seven days after he receives the response.27 However, if the ten­• 
ant fails to take possession of the personal property within "the additional 
fifteen (I5) day period, the property shall be conclusively deemed aban­
doned and the owner may retain or dispose of the property."277 
Unless the notice and demand is to be given by publication, it is impor­
tant that the landlord obtain the tenant's new mailing address before the 
tenant leaves the premises. As noted earlier/" obtaining the new mailing 
address is also important for purposes of refunding the deposit. In some 
circumstances, the landlord might be able to obtain that address from the 
tenant at the time she enters the lease, but in the usual circumstance that will 
not be possible. The landlord will have to be diligent in this detail. If he 
fails, or is unable to obtain it subsequently, he will have to use the publica­
tion process. 
The periods of time provided in the notice and demand process appear 
minimal and, in many situations, will not provide enough time for even a 
diligent tenant to reclaim her property. This might be particularly true if the 
tenant leaves the state. It is not uncommon for mail to take four or five days 
to reach some parts of the country from Wyoming. In that case, a diligent 
response by the tenant is unlikely to arrive by return mail within the seven­
271. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-121O(a)(i) (LEXIS 1999). 
272. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-12010(a)(i)(A) (LEXIS 1999). 
273. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1201O(a)(i)(B)(LEXIS 1999). 
274. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-12010(a)(i)(C) (LEXIS 1999). 
275. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-12010(a)(ii) (LEX IS 1999). Perhaps the statement should have pro­
vided that it will be conclusively deemed to be ''valueless and abandoned" since the earlier stated re­
quirement is that the landlord can dispose of the property if it is ''valueless and abandoned." In the 
alternative, perhaps the earlier statement should have omitted any reference to "valueless" property. 
276. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-12JO(a)(iii) (LEXIS 1999). 
277. Id. The section is confusing regarding the meaning of "the additional fifteen day period." No 
fifteen day period is mentioned in the section. It appears to be a drafting error. The original Senate File 
No. SF 0046 (1997) provided the tenant with fifteen days to reclaim the property, which was then short­
ened to seven days in House Bill No. HB 0044 (1999), but this reference to fifteen days was erroneously 
not concorded. This conflict raises significant confusion and requires corrective legislation. 
278. See supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text. 
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day period commencing with the date of initial mailing.''" It would also be 
very difficult for a person who moves a considerable distance from the state 
to return within the seven (or fifteen day) period to reclaim the property.2B· 
The Act imposes no obligation on the landlord to use the method of 
service most likely to apprise the tenant of the fact that the landlord is 
holding personal property belonging to the tenant. In fact, the landlord may 
choose to serve by publication without any previous attempt at personal 
service. Furthermore, the notice need only be published once in a local 
county newspaper. Such a minimal notice is not designed to reach a tenant 
who has moved out of the State or even out of the county. If the landlord 
has the tenant's mailing address, or even good reason to know where the 
tenant is located, the use of notice by publication is evidence of the land­
lord's bad faith. In fact, such minimal notice raises serious question of the 
constitutionality of this particular provision in the Act.28\ 
Since the Act applies to all personal property left on the premises, the 
item of personal property may actually belong to a third party. Sometimes, 
the personal property may itself provide an indication that it belongs to a 
third party and not the tenant. For example, it may be a wallet or purse with 
the name and address of the owner contained inside. Notifying the tenant 
about property that does not belong to the tenant is not the best way to re­
turn it to the true owner. The landlord's good faith should require that he 
notify the true owner, if possible. Thereafter, the true owner should respond 
and reclaim the property in the same way and in the same time constraints 
that apply to the tenant under the Act.282 
Since the Act provides that if the tenant does not reclaim the property 
promptly "the property shall be conclusively deemed abandoned and the 
owner may retain or dispose of the property"2.' the tenant's title to the per­
sonal property is terminated. As a result, the landlord may dispose of the 
property without fear that the tenant may claim that he converted it. Al­
though not specifically stated in the Act, the landlord should also be able to 
apply the abandoned personal property to the payment of any accrued rent 
or unpaid damages. If it is abandoned and the landlord may retain it, he 
should be able to apply it to these obligations. 
279. Original Senate File No. SF0046 (1997) would have allowed fifteen days, which is a much more 
reasonable period for any tenant who leaves the State after the lease terminates. 
280. Since the tenant is required to pay storage costs (WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1210(b) (LEXIS 
1999), if the tenant indicates that she will return within a reasonable time, the landlord should be ex­
pected to act in good faith and hold the property for the tenant, despite the times stated in the Act. 
281. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
282. However, as noted, the Act does not provide for notice to the guest or invitee. Similar constitu­
tional issues are relevant here. !d. 
283. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1210(a)(ii) (LEXIS 1999) 
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The Act provides that the landlord is entitled to reasonable storage costs 
if he stores the property personally and actual storage costs if he stores it 
commercially!" The Act then provides that "[p]ayment of the storage costs 
shall be made before the renter removes the property. "2a5 This statement, 
without ever using the word "lien," gives the landlord a right in the nature 
of a lien on the personal property. However, that lien is not for payment of 
any accrued rent or costs of damage repair, but only for payment of storage 
costs. Since there is no provision giving this "lien" priority over any other 
lien, another previously perfected lien, such as an Article 9 security interest, 
will prevail. 
G. 	 Landlord's Tort Liabilities 
As discussed at the beginning of this article,286 under the common law 
the primary effect of a lease transaction was to convey a leasehold estate in 
the premises from the landlord to the tenant. As a result, the owner had no 
duty to protect the tenant or third parties from injury to person or property. 
Those duties were on the shoulders of the tenant. In general, those princi­
ples continue in the laws of many states, including Wyoming, albeit subject 
to some exceptions.287 The exceptions are stated as follows in Ortega v. 
Flaim.,a. 
Over time, the courts created exceptions to the rule of landlord 
nonliability, some of which have been recognized in Wyoming: 
1. 	 Undisclosed conditions mown to lessor and unlmown to the 
lessee, which were hidden or latently dangerous and caused an 
lOJury.... 
2. 	 The premises were leased for public use and a member of the 
public was injured. 
3. 	 Part of the premises was retained under the lessor's control, but 
was open to the use of the lessee .... 
4. 	 Lessor had contracted to repair the premises ... . 
5. 	 Negligence by the lessor in making repairs .....289 
Despite the variety of exceptions from the common law rule of nonli­
ability, situations have arisen which did not fit within the list. One such 
circumstance arose in the Ortega case, in which a third party invitee of the 
tenant slipped and fell down stairs in the leased premises. The tenant had 
284. 	 WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1210(b) (LEXIS 1999). 
285. Jd. The Act also provides that "[t]he owner is not responsible for any loss to the renter from 
storage." WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1210(c)(LEXIS 1999). 
286. 	 See supra notes 22 & 36-28 and accompanying text. 
287. See. e.g.. Taylor v. Schukei Family Trust, 996 P.2d 13 (Wyo. 2000); Roberts v. Klinkosh, 986 
P.2d 153, 154 (Wyo. 1999); Krierv. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405, 406 (Wyo. 1997). 
288. 	 902 P.2d 199 (Wyo. 1995). 
289. 	 Jd. at 202. 
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previously complained to the landlord about the steepness of the stairs, the 
narrowness of the treads and the lack of a handrail. Nevertheless, since the 
situation did not fit within the listed exceptions, the district court granted the 
landlord's motion for summary judgment. The invitee appealed to the Su­
preme Court arguing that the court should abandon the common law rule of 
landlord nonliability. Instead, the invitee argued, the court should apply the 
general rules of tort liability and impose a duty of reasonable care on the 
landlord. In the alternative, the invitee argued that the court should adopt an 
implied warranty of habitability for leased premises. If the court were to do 
so, the duty of the landlord to provide a safe and habitable premise would 
extend to both the tenant and her invitee. 
The court declined to abandon the common law rule or to adopt an im­
plied warranty of habitability.'" The court stated: "In our opinion this is a 
matter for the legislature, and we decline to abrogate the common law in 
this instance without a proper record and insightful analysis of whether con­
ditions in Wyoming warrant a change regarding residential leases. ''29' 
The Wyoming legislature has now considered whether the conditions in 
Wyoming warrant the adoption of an implied warranty of habitability and 
has adopted the Residential Rental Property Act creating such an implied 
warranty. It would appear that the logical conclusion to be drawn from the 
legislative adoption of an implied warranty of habitability is that third par­
ties, in proper circumstances, may recover from the landlord for that breach 
to the same extent as a tenant.'92 
Nevertheless, many pitfalls still remain in the way of recovery. Since 
the tenant may waive the implied warranty, the invitee will have to deter­
mine whether there has been an effective waiver of the warranty.''' Even if 
the tenant has not waived the warranty, the invitee will have to determine 
290. The Wyoming Supreme Court had previously adopted an implied warranty of habitability in the 
sale of new homes by a builder/developer. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735-36 
(Wyo. 1979); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275,1282 (Wyo. 1975). 
291. Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199,204 (Wyo. 1995). This statement was actually made regarding 
the abandonment of the common law rule of nonliability and the adoption of a standard of reasonable 
care. However, the court then stated, with regard to the implied warranty of habitability: "For the same 
reasons discussed above, the rule of an implied warranty of habitability will not be extended to rental 
premises under these facts." Id. 
292. The court did not expressly address the question of whether landlords would have liability to 
third parties if it were to adopt an implied warranty of habitability. However, in resolving the issue as it 
did by refusing to adopt an implied warranty of habitability and not denying the possibility that an im­
plied warranty of habitability, if adopted, would extend to third parties, it left the impression (as silent 
dicta) that were it to adopt an implied warranty of habitability, the warranty would be available to invit­
ees as well as the tenant. Furthermore, the court has regularly extended landlord tort liability to third 
parties if one of the exceptions to the common law rule of landlord nonliability should exist. See, e.g., 
Taylor v. Schukei Family Trust, 996 P.2d \3 (Wyo. 2000). If third parties may recover under that prin­
ciple, there does not seem to be any reason why they should not be able to recover under an implied 
warranty of habitability also. 
293. See supra notes !O3-18 and accompanying text. 
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whether the tenant gave the landlord notice of the defecU94 Some injuries 
may involve circumstances where the defect is a breach of the implied war­
ranty but its danger may have been exacerbated by the tenant's acts or fail­
ure to act. In that circumstance, the invitee may have to determine whether 
it was the landlord's breach or the tenant's acts that caused the injury. If 
both the landlord and the tenant have responsibility, the invitee will have to 
deal with the issues of comparative fault and severalliability.'9s 
III. CONCLUSION 
If one were to use a report card to measure how well legislation re­
sponds to a societal need, the Residential Rental Property Act would not 
score very well. It would receive a very low grade for effectively accom­
plishing the objective it set out to remedy. What it gives with one hand it 
often takes away with the other. However, the authors of the Act deserve a 
high grade for recognizing the need to correct an imbalance in the law and 
beginning the process of correcting it. A Confucian proverb states, "A 
journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step." This Act most cer­
tainly takes that step; what now remains is to complete the journey. Both 
the legislature and the judiciary have an opportunity to play a significant 
role in that venture. 
In the process of reviewing the Act, I commented on numerous is­
sues-perhaps so many that one's attention is shifted from the main prob­
lems with the Act to less important ones. To give focus on what needs to be 
done to improve the implied warranty of habitability, I would like to return 
to what I believe are the three primary issues in the Act as it currently ex­
ists. These issues deal with assuring tenants that the protection of the im­
plied warranty cannot be denied to them by the simple act of the landlord's 
disclaimer, and that the remedies provided to them will be prompt and ade­
quate for the purpose of enforcing the warranty. 
For societal, economical and technological reasons, today's residential 
real estate market is not what it was when landlord tenant law had its origins 
in the common law. Nor is that market the same as it was only a hundred 
years ago. Today, our economy can support a safe and sanitary home for all 
of its citizens.'96 Our definition of a habitable residence today is one that has 
heat, electricity, plumbing, and hot and cold running water. The Residential 
294. See supra notes 125-41 and accompanying text. While all that should be necessary is that the 
landlord have had notice of the defect, there may be an issue about whether the tenant has to go further 
and give a "notice to repair or correct condition." 
295. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (LEXIS 1999). 
296. Unfortunately, this statement is not completely true. There are some people in our society today 
who cannot afford safe and sanitary housing and even some who have no housing whatsoever. How­
ever, this article is not about the plight of the homeless or even about creating affordable housing. 
Rather, it is about people who can afford housing and assuring them they will receive what they paid for 
-safe and sanitary housing that is fit for human habitation. 
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Rental Property Act created an implied warranty stating precisely that. 
However, it also creates the distinct possibility that those reasonable ameni­
ties can be taken away. It allows the landlord to disclaim responsibility for 
them. Given the oligopolistic nature of the residential rental market, there is 
usually an imbalance in bargaining postures between a prospective tenant 
and her landlord, especially in locales where there is a shortage of housing. 
If the landlord is allowed to force the tenant to waive her implied warranty 
in order to obtain housing, the implied warranty created by the Act is a 
myth. 
The Act currently has two provisions allowing the landlord to disclaim 
the implied warranty, one potentially more problematic than the other. The 
first one allows the landlord to disclaim his responsibilities to provide heat, 
electricity, plumbing, and hot and cold running water if it is "otherwise 
agreed upon in writing by both parties."297 The second provides that "[a]ny 
duty or obligation in this article may be assigned to a different party or 
modified by explicit written agreement signed by the parties."'" The extent 
to which these provisions allow the landlord to avoid his duties under the 
implied warranty depends on how the courts interpret the disclaimer provi­
sions. If they allow the landlord to insert general disclaimers without any 
barter in that regard, the Act will lose viability and there will be no assur­
ance that housing will be habitable. However, if the courts insist that, in 
order to waive the warranty, the tenant's attention must be drawn to a spe­
cific defect, that she will have the opportunity to evaluate that defect, and 
that there is consideration for the tenant's waiver, the Act will have teeth. 
Indeed, that seems to be the intent of the second disclaimer provision-the 
wording of the disclaimer must be "explicit." The legislature can also help 
to repair this potential hole in the effectiveness of the Act by amending it to 
clarify the meaning of "explicit" and by removing the first waiver provision, 
which is really unnecessary given the existence'ofthe second one. 
The remedies for breach of the implied warranty raise two issues. The 
first concerns the promptness of the remedy. As currently written the tenant 
must go through a three step process in order to obtain relief. The first two 
steps are duplicative and unnecessarily burdensome. First, the tenant must 
notify the landlord by certified mail or personal service that there is a defect 
and request that it be corrected. Then if the landlord has not responded 
within a reasonable time, she must again notify the landlord by certified 
mail or personal service stating that she previously notified him, repeating 
the contents of that prior notice, again demanding that the defect be cor­
rected, and if the defect is not corrected within three days stating that she 
will commence enforcing her rights through the legal process. 
297. wYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202(a)(LEXIS 1999). 
298. wYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202(d) (LEXIS 1999). 
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The second notice is without any meaningful purpose unless it is to 
delay relief. The landlord certainly is entitled to notice of the defect-oth­
erwise he may not be able to repair it. However, the first notice accom­
plishes that purpose. There is no reason why it is necessary to tell that 
landlord the same thing again. Nor is it necessary to tell him that if he does 
not correct the defect the tenant will begin legal process-he should know 
that legal rights are meant to be enforced. By the time the tenant is able to 
obtain relief she may have to suffer for over three weeks without heat, hot 
or cold running water or other amenities. Then there is still no assurance 
that the defect will be corrected. The system, as drafted, encourages land­
lords to be dilatory. The legislature should seriously consider redrafting the 
notice process. A written notice, not necessarily delivered by certified mail, 
informing the landlord about the defect and requesting that it be corrected, 
is all that is necessary. Thereafter, if the tenant waits a reasonable time un­
der the circumstances for the landlord to correct the defect, she should be 
able to seek immediate relief. 
The second remedy issue concerns the availability of an adequate rem­
edy. As the Act is currently written, the only remedies specifically provided 
are damages, termination, and affirmative relief. If the tenant goes through 
the two step notice procedure, the primary remedy available to her is dam­
ages.'99 The landlord has no incentive from the structure of that remedy 
itself to perform the repair promptly-he has her rent money and the use of 
it. Even if he ultimately corrects the defect, the tenant may have suffered 
unnecessarily and might even leave the premises. The Act does allow the 
court to grant affirmative relief in the nature of specific performance, but by 
the time that relief is actually enforced an unnecessarily longer time will 
have transpired. 
Courts in other states have considered the question of appropriate relief 
and have recognized the need to craft a remedy that will be quick and create 
an incentive for the landlord to perform the repair. The two most common 
remedies these courts provide are rent abatement and repair and offset. The 
first creates and incentive for the landlord to perform the repair since it al­
lows the tenant to withhold rent or a portion of it until the defect is cor­
rected. The second actually allows the tenant to use rent monies to perform 
the repair. Neither of these two are authorized by the Act. However, being 
judicially created remedies, there is no reason prohibiting the Wyoming 
courts from allowing such relief. 
An alternative remedy reasonably available under current law is rent 
escrow. Under this remedy, the tenant deposits the rent with the court and 
commences legal process to have the parties' rights to the rent determined. 
299. A court may also terminate the lease or grant affirmative relief. 
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The advantage this remedy provides the tenant over the remedy of damages 
is that, just like rent abatement, it denies the landlord access to the rent un­
less and until the repairs are made. When combined with the authority un­
der the Act to grant affIrmative relief to the tenant, the court can demand 
that the landlord correct the repair before receiving the rent, or a portion of 
it. While the courts should be able to grant this relief based on current law, 
it would be helpful if the legislature were to amend the Act specifically to 
allow it. 
Clarification and/or correction of the three issues raised above will go a 
long way in assuring tenants in Wyoming that they genuinely have an im­
plied warranty of habitability. However, the first major step has been 
taken-Wyoming now has an implied warranty of habitability in residential 
rental situations. As stated at the beginning of this article, law students have 
sometimes mockingly referred to landlord tenant law in Wyoming as 
"landlord law." It seems fair to say that today Wyoming has "landlord ten­
ant law." However, now there is a need for the judiciary and the legislature 
to assure that the "tenant" portion of that statement has real meaning. 
